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THE DEBILITATING EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: PATENTS 
AND PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY  
William Hubbard* 
Abstract 
Are we underestimating the costs of patent protection? Scholars have 
long recognized that patent law is a double-edged sword. While patents 
promote innovation, they also limit the number of people who can benefit 
from new inventions. In the past, policy makers striving to balance the 
costs and benefits of patents have analyzed patent law through the lens of 
traditional, neoclassical economics. This Article argues that this approach 
is fundamentally flawed because traditional economics rely on an 
inaccurate oversimplification: that individuals and firms always maximize 
profits. In actuality, so-called “productive inefficiencies” often prevent 
profit maximization. For example, cognitive biases, bounded rationality, 
habituation, and opportunism all contribute to productive inefficiencies 
that harm individuals, firms, and ultimately society. Moreover, a variety of 
theoretical analyses and empirical studies demonstrate that robust 
competition reduces productive inefficiencies. Consequently, patents that 
substantially limit competition exacerbate productive inefficiencies and an 
important effect of patent law therefore has been systematically 
overlooked. This Article begins to fill this void and demonstrates that 
consideration of productive inefficiencies sheds new light on numerous 
unresolved and contentious debates in patent law. 
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“The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” 
Nobel Laureate J.R. Hicks (1935)1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most innovative sectors of the 
U.S. economy. Every year, pharmaceutical companies invest tens of 
billions of dollars in research and development discovering new drugs.2 
Many of these discoveries are protected with patents and even some critics 
of patent law concede that pharmaceutical patents generally promote the 
discovery of new drugs.3 But the innovative successes of pharmaceutical 
companies may conceal puzzling failures. According to some 
commentators, pharmaceutical companies have failed to adopt modern 
manufacturing techniques that are common in other industries; as a result, 
                                                                                                                     
 1. J. R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935).  
 2. PHRMA, 2013 PROFILE: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY 31 (2013), 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA%20Profile%202013.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 106 (2008) (noting that “managers in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries consider[] patents as essential to developing and marketing 
30 percent or more of inventions”). 
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pharmaceutical manufacturing is comparatively slow, expensive, and error-
prone.4 Manufacturing mediocrity in the pharmaceutical industry is 
particularly surprising because even modest improvements could 
substantially increase profits.5 In fact, pharmaceutical companies spend 
more on manufacturing than they do on research and development.6 
How could pharmaceutical companies be so good at the difficult task of 
discovering new drugs but so bad at the comparatively easy task of 
embracing modern manufacturing techniques? Although many factors 
affect drug manufacturing,7 this Article identifies an overlooked and 
unlikely culprit: strong pharmaceutical patents. Moreover, this Article 
argues that the subpar manufacturing of medicines not only undercuts the 
profits of pharmaceutical companies but also reduces welfare for all of 
society. 
Without a doubt, innovation produces massive social benefits. Through 
technological improvements many people today live longer, healthier, 
more productive lives.8 Patents can be a key driver of socially beneficial 
innovation. Discovering new inventions often requires substantial time, 
effort, and capital, and patents encourage inventors and businesses to 
invest in research and development by providing inventors with exclusive 
rights to their discoveries.9 Unfortunately, although patents have great 
                                                                                                                     
 4. W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 500 (2014) (arguing that “[p]harmaceutical 
manufacturing has lagged far behind other industries in adopting modern manufacturing 
techniques”).  
 5. Id. at 504 (“Tens of billions of dollars are spent annually on [pharmaceutical] 
manufacturing inefficiencies. Efficiency increases consequently carry large potential benefits.”); see 
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 574 (1969) 
(noting that “[c]ost reduction will enable the monopolist to increase its profits”). 
 6. Price, supra note 4, at 497 & n.39 (stating that for pharmaceutical companies 
“[m]anufacturing is either the largest or secondlargest expense” behind sales and marketing). 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 510–12 (arguing that regulatory hurdles and insufficient patent protection 
undermine incentives to develop improved manufacturing processes in the pharmaceutical 
industry).  
 8. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that innovation produced almost 
75% of the growth in the U.S. economy since World War II. ARTI RAI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & 
PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 2 (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/migrated/Patent_Reform-paper.pdf. Other estimates are lower, but are still significant. 
See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA 36 (2005), available at 
http://www.compete.org/publications/detail/202/innovate-america/ (noting that innovation generates 
productivity that has accounted for approximately half of U.S. GDP growth over the past fifty 
years); see also JUDY ESTRIN, CLOSING THE INNOVATION GAP: REIGNITING THE SPARK OF CREATIVITY 
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 142 (2009), available at http://www.books24x7.com/marc.asp?bookid= 
29867 (“The growth of the U.S. economy has become dependent on the small, innovative 
companies that have thrived for decades in places like Silicon Valley.”). However, not all patented 
inventions produce commercially successful innovations. See infra Section III.C. 
 9. For citations regarding the incentive benefits of patent rights, see infra note 51. 
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capacity to benefit society, they can also reduce social welfare. For 
example, owners of exclusive patent rights sometimes raise the costs of 
products and services that incorporate new inventions and some customers 
may be unable to afford these higher prices as a result.10 Furthermore, 
patent owners can use their rights to obstruct technological progress by 
preventing others from building upon their patented inventions.11 
Balancing costs and benefits is thus vital to the development of 
effective patent laws, and lawmakers strive to calibrate this trade-off by 
adjusting the contours of patent rights.12 Unfortunately, empirically 
measuring the full costs and benefits of patent law is infeasible (if not 
impossible) and this prevents a mathematical optimization.13 Instead, 
numerous government entities, including Congress, the courts, and the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, define the contours of patent law through 
their activities and interactions.14 In this process, the identification of 
which costs and benefits stem from patent protection is critical. If 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2113 
(2013) (noting that certain “patents would, if valid, give [the owner of the patents] the exclusive 
right” to perform certain medical tests). 
 11. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990) (noting the social costs of patents, which include reduction of 
competition). 
 12. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 21 (2003) (discussing patent law’s purported design to achieve a 
cost–benefit trade-off).  
 13. See id. at 9 (“The economic case for abolishing intellectual property rights has not been 
made. But neither economic theory nor empirical evidence enables a ringing endorsement of any 
complete body of [patents or copyrights].”); William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak 
Patents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1934 (2013); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent 
Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 931 (asserting that “the patent system does not engage, nor is it 
equipped to engage, in macroscopic cost-benefit analyses to determine the ideal scope of particular 
exclusive rights”); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 7 (2004) (“How much propertization is too much? That is 
an empirical question to which no one knows the answer.”). Economist Fritz Machlup famously 
concluded his study of the U.S. patent system, unsure of the system’s social utility, with the 
following: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. 
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, 
on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.  
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
80 (Comm. Print 1958).  
 14. See Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal 
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1251–53 (2004) (noting the relationship 
between Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 
92 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402352 (discussing the “patent dialogue” between the branches of 
the federal government). 
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lawmakers, judges, and scholars systematically overlook substantial costs 
or benefits from patent law, the patent system in the United States cannot 
operate effectively. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Oliver 
Williamson observed, “analysis influences the way the world is perceived, 
including the power to delude and misguide as well as to illuminate and 
instruct.”15 
Today, traditional or “neoclassical” economics constitute the dominant 
approach to identifying the costs and benefits of patent law. Under this 
approach, patent rights benefit society by creating economic incentives to 
discover, disclose, and commercialize new inventions but harm society by 
allowing firms to raise prices above competitive levels.16 In describing 
these costs and benefits, neoclassical economics is grounded on the 
assumption that individuals and firms maximize profits.17 As a result, the 
argument goes, when patent law is properly calibrated, the “invisible hand” 
of the market will typically prompt self-interested firms to make decisions 
that ultimately maximize social welfare.18  
Although many economists embrace the profit-maximization 
assumption, a growing group of economists does not.19 For example, 
                                                                                                                     
 15. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 249 (1975); see also Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing 
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (asserting that “the abstract 
level of economic thinking . . . drives most intellectual property policymaking”); Dennis D. Crouch, 
The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 141, 141–42 (2008) (“Policymakers’ understanding of both the upside and downside of patent 
protection is important so they can better calibrate the rights granted: making them strong enough to 
help induce innovation and development while limiting monopolistic problems.”). 
 16. See infra Section I.A. 
 17. See ROGER S. FRANTZ, X-EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND APPLICATIONS 63 (1988) 
(“The neoclassical assumption of rationality was applied in such a way as to make the production 
process seem like a mechanical process and for the firm to be nothing other than an efficient 
converter of inputs into their maximum outputs.”); HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY 
THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 9 (1978) (“Let us recall that according to the neoclassical 
theory all of the options are known and the prices of inputs and outputs are also known.”); N. 
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 282–88 (6th ed. 2012) (“The goal of a 
competitive firm is to maximize profit . . . .”); WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 250 (noting that 
standard economic theory “assume[s] that the firm operates on its production function, which shows 
the maximum output of product that can be realized from each feasible combination of factor 
inputs”); Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 2; Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a 
Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 209, 224 (1996) (noting that the basic operating 
assumption under modern neoclassical economics is that “firms always seek to maximize their 
profits”). 
 18. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 11 (“[D]espite decentralized decision making and self-
interested decision makers, market economies have proven remarkably successful in organizing 
economic activity to promote overall economic well-being.”). 
 19. According to one economist, “the hypothesis of profit maximization has mutated into an 
axiom.” RICHARD E. CAVES, INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY IN SIX NATIONS 1 (1992); see also RICHARD E. 
CAVES & DAVID R. BARTON, EFFICIENCY IN U.S. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1 (1990) (“[S]ome 
economists declare [productive] inefficiency to lie outside the reach of analytically founded 
5
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numerous economists assert that individuals do not maximize profits due 
to cognitive biases, limited cognitive capacities, and bad habits.20 Others 
have demonstrated that conflicts between principals and agents can prevent 
firms from maximizing their profits.21 All of these economists agree that 
inherent features of human behavior and interpersonal interaction often 
prevent individuals and firms from maximizing their profits. Moreover, 
such failure to maximize profits reduces social welfare.22 However, this 
harm to society is not inevitable. Modern economists argue on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds that competition drives individuals and 
firms toward profit maximization and thus increases social welfare.23 
Despite the importance of this economic scholarship, it is unfortunately 
fragmented and widely dispersed. Some economists focus only on 
individual obstacles to profit maximization and only analyze the effects of 
competition in passing.24 Though other economists provide more fulsome 
analyses, they also employ different terminology to describe circumstances that 
prevent firms from maximizing their own profits, including “internal 
inefficiency,”25 “organizational slack,”26 “productive inefficiency,”27 
“technical inefficiency,”28 and “X-inefficiency.”29 
                                                                                                                     
economic analysis because the manager of an inefficient activity is failing to maximize its profits, 
and the maximization of profits by the business is taken as equivalent to the maximization of utility 
by the individual, a largely unquestioned axiom of economic analysis.”). 
 20. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 67–68; HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND 
RATIONAL 198 (1957); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 22–39 (2008) (discussing cognitive bias); WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 15, at 21 (describing“bounded rationality”); David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal 
Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1979–80 (2012) (describing various cognitive biases).  
 21. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 26–30 (discussing employees’ opportunistic use 
of asymmetrical information); Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26–30 (1999) (discussing principal–agent problems in the context of the 
employee–inventor). 
 22. See infra Section II.B. 
 23. See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
 24. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 20, at 198 (discussing “bounded rationality,” which posits 
that the capacity of the human mind is limited relative to the complex problems facing humans); 
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 22–39 (discussing cognitive biases). 
 25. Posner, supra note 5, at 573. 
 26. F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 35 
(2d ed. 1980); see also Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the 
Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 159, 179 (2006), 
available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0208.pdf. 
 27. CAVES, supra note 19, at 1; cf. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 78 
(1982) (“Whereas allocative efficiency concerns overall placement of resources in the economy, 
productive, or technical, efficiency refers to individual firms’ use of their resources in the most 
effective manner.”). 
 28. CAVES, supra note 19, at 1; CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 2; Alison Green & David 
Mayes, Technical Inefficiency in Manufacturing Industries, 101 ECON. J. 523, 524 (1991), 
available at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/ecjeconjl/default1991.htm (“Technical inefficiency 
6
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Perhaps because of this multiplicity of approaches to these issues in the 
economic literature, patent scholars have largely ignored the ramifications 
of these economic insights on the design of effective legal systems.30 In the 
words of two prominent scholars, “[intellectual property], perhaps more 
than any other substantive area of law, is grounded in the rational actor 
model that undergirds classical economics.”31 Only a small group of patent 
scholars have applied a broader economic perspective to patent law, and 
these scholars have limited their analyses to specific contexts, such as the 
effects of cognitive biases on inventors and judges.32 Patent law scholars 
thus have not recognized that firms and individuals often do not maximize 
their profits and that this overlooked economic insight contradicts 
fundamental assumptions lying at the heart of current patent policy.  
This Article begins to fill this void in the literature regarding the 
economic effects of patent law. To start, this Article collects, unifies, and 
                                                                                                                     
is thus the failure to achieve maximum possible output from whatever combination of inputs have 
been chosen.”). 
 29. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 194; LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17 at 104–06; see also CAVES & 
BARTON, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency). 
 30. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 11 (asserting that there is “a tendency among 
economic analysts of intellectual property to reduce the entire problem of intellectual property 
rights to a tradeoff between ‘incentive[s]’ [to create] and ‘access’ [to those creations]”); Buccafusco 
& Sprigman, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that “there has been relatively little discussion of [modern 
economic theories’] implications for intellectual property (IP) law”). For a more detailed account of 
the conventional economic view of patent scholars, see infra notes 51, 54, 60, and 65 and 
accompanying text. In other areas of law, particularly in antitrust law, scholars have better engaged 
modern economic perspectives. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust 
Law of Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 798–99 (1989) (discussing productive inefficiency 
in the context of antitrust law); Gerla, supra note 17, at 223–28 (discussing productive inefficiency 
under the label “X-inefficiency” in the context of antitrust law); Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone 
II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 
1517–18 (2012) (arguing that considerations of behavioral economics should not affect antitrust 
law and critiquing the behavioralist approach).  
 31. Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 3. 
 32. E.g., id. at 4 (arguing that the “endowment effect” may undermine the transfer of 
intellectual property rights); Crouch, supra note 15, at 161 (arguing that “bounded rationality” 
affects inventors’ decisions to seek patent protection); Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1248–50 
(arguing that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues invalid patents in part because patent 
examiners are boundedly rational); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 701 (1998), available at 
http://www.cornellcollege.edu/dimensions/workshops/reading-group-resources/science-280.pdf 
(asserting that the ‘“attribution bias”’ hinders patent licensing); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1411–20 (2006) (arguing that hindsight bias affects whether decision makers 
find that patents are obvious in light of the prior art); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-
Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2155–56 (2009) (asserting that cognitive biases will 
prompt inventors to seek patents that are not cost-justified). Broader applications of modern 
economic analyses to patent law are exceedingly rare. See, e.g., Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational 
Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 214 (2012) (applying the 
insights of new institutional economics to patent policy).  
7
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harmonizes much of the economic scholarship analyzing obstacles to profit 
maximization, beginning by adopting the single term “productive 
inefficiency” to describe any situation in which individuals or firms fail to 
maximize their own profits. Building from the existing economic literature, 
this Article argues that competition generally improves productive 
efficiency. Using these economic insights, this Article argues that 
traditional economic analyses of patent law fail to correctly assess the costs 
and benefits stemming from patent protection because patent rights that 
restrain competition can undermine profit maximization. As a result, firms 
will not respond to financial inducements to invent in the ways predicted 
by neoclassical economics.33 For instance, pharmaceutical firms may 
tolerate outdated manufacturing technologies and processes because 
powerful patents protect their products.  
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by describing in more 
detail the traditional neoclassical economic model and its use by patent 
scholars. Part I establishes that patent scholars typically rely upon 
neoclassical economics to identify and analyze the costs and benefits of 
patent law in order to increase social welfare. Part II then synthesizes the 
substantial economic literature rejecting the neoclassical assumption of 
profit maximization and identifying numerous factors that limit the 
productive efficiency of individuals and firms. Part II also details the harms 
to society caused by productive inefficiencies and the economic 
mechanisms to reduce those harms. In particular, Part II argues that 
competition reduces productive inefficiencies. Part III applies this more 
fulsome economic perspective to patent law in general, as well as to three 
unresolved debates in patent law regarding the commercialization of 
patented inventions, patent scope, and patent examination. Finally, the 
Conclusion provides a brief summary of the main arguments in this 
Article.  
I.  NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND PATENT LAW 
Most legal scholars rely on traditional neoclassical economics to 
analyze the effects of patent law, and thus, a clear understanding of this 
model is required to appreciate the role that neoclassical economics plays 
in patent law scholarship. 
A.  Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical economics is founded on the assumption that individuals 
and firms minimize costs and maximize profits.34 Economist Oliver 
Williamson has described this assumption in more detail:  
                                                                                                                     
 33. See infra Section I.A. 
 34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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[I]t is assumed that the firm operates on its production 
function, which shows the maximum output of product that 
can be realized from each feasible combination of factor 
inputs (mainly labor and capital). Failure to operate on the 
production function would imply wasteful use of inputs; this 
is assumed away.35  
Importantly, this assumption generates one of the most important 
conclusions of neoclassical economics: that competitive markets typically 
maximize social welfare.36 To maximize profits, firms must compete with 
their rivals, and this competition drives prices down. Lower prices allow 
for more transactions to be completed and each successful transaction 
benefits consumers.37 For example, when a consumer is willing to pay $10 
to purchase a product but is able to purchase it at a market price of only $7, 
the consumer enjoys a benefit of $3. Economists call such a benefit from 
trade to a consumer a “consumer surplus.”38 Similarly, if the manufacturer 
of the product is willing to sell it for $5, then the sale at a price of $7 also 
creates a “producer surplus” of $2.39 Neoclassical economists argue that 
competitive markets reach an equilibrium that maximizes social welfare 
because competition drives prices down to a level that supports the 
maximum number of socially beneficial transactions, thereby maximizing 
the total consumer and producer surpluses.40  
Although market transactions generate social wealth, neoclassical 
economics recognizes that they may fail to take place in (at least) two 
canonical situations. First, a monopolist may strategically decide to engage 
in only certain transactions by raising prices (or as economists prefer to 
phrase it, restrict output so that prices rise due to consumer demand).41 
Some consumers will be unable to afford the higher price, and some 
socially beneficial transactions therefore will not take place resulting in the 
loss of some of the total surplus. Economists refer to this loss as 
                                                                                                                     
 35. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 250. 
 36. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 11. 
 37. Id. at 136–41 (discussing the economic principle of consumer surplus).  
 38. The consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the amount a consumer is 
willing to pay for a good or service and the price that the consumer actually pays for it. Id. at 137.  
 39. Specifically, a producer surplus is the difference between the price that a producer 
charges and the producer’s valuation of the good or service. Id. at 141. Because profit-maximizing 
firms will not sell if their costs exceed their financial returns, neoclassical economics concludes that 
each transaction generates a producer surplus. 
 40. Id. at 136, 145–46 (describing total surplus). 
 41. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 212 (discussing the problems that transaction costs and 
externalities have on reaching an efficient bargain); id. at 306–07 (discussing profit maximization 
vis-à-vis monopolization). 
9
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“deadweight loss” and this situation as “allocative inefficiency.”42 
Although the monopolist also suffers from the deadweight losses by 
sacrificing some of its producer surplus, the monopolist more than makes 
up for these losses through higher prices paid by consumers who can still 
afford the goods or services. Although profit maximization by the 
monopolist can reduce social welfare,43 the monopolist’s desire to 
maximize profits limits the harm to social welfare by preventing the 
monopolist from raising prices to even higher levels. According to 
neoclassical economic analysis, the monopolist will raise prices until its 
marginal costs equal its marginal revenues but no further.44  
A second scenario in which market transactions do not take place is 
when transaction costs prevent producers and consumers from 
consummating transactions.45 As economist Ronald Coase famously 
argued, if transactions are costless to consummate, individuals will 
voluntarily agree to exchanges that increase both individual and social 
welfare.46 In reality, however, transaction costs are often substantial and 
thus “prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in 
which the pricing system worked without cost.”47 When transaction costs 
are nontrivial, markets may fail to maximize social welfare.48  
                                                                                                                     
 42. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 2–3; id. at 21 (“The costs of monopoly power are thus 
relatively high prices for lower than desired output rates and a distortion in the mix of goods from 
what consumers desire.”); MANKIW, supra note 17, at 178.  
 43. Another effect of monopolies is wasteful ‘“rent seeking”’—“[e]conomic rent is a return 
over and above the cost of generating the return; it is pure profit, and so worth incurring costs to 
obtain, even if the costs exceed the social benefit from the undertaking, as they often do.” LANDES 
& POSNER, supra note 12, at 17. In competing to obtain a monopoly, firms may spend wastefully. 
Id. at 16–18; see also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1112 (2007) (noting that rent seeking often arises with efforts to capture 
“government largesse”).  
 44. MANKIW, supra note 17, at 307 (positing that the “equality of marginal revenue and 
marginal cost determines the profit-maximizing quantity” for both competitive firms and 
monopolies).  
 45. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 16 (noting that if transaction costs are too high, “a 
property right may prevent optimal adjustments to changing values”); see also MANKIW, supra note 
17, at 212.  
 46. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6, 8 (1960); accord 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 & n.12 (1972) (“Recently it has been argued 
that on certain assumptions, usually termed the absence of transaction costs, Pareto optimality or 
economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitlement.”). 
 47. Coase, supra note 46, at 15. 
 48. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 46, at 1106–09 (“Often the cost of establishing the 
value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the 
entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur.” (emphasis added)). 
Although not the focus of this Article, markets also do not maximize social welfare when 
externalities prevent the price of a product from accurately reflecting the costs (or benefits) 
stemming from the product. MANKIW, supra note 17, at 197–202. In such a situation, market forces 
can promote the production of too much (or too little) of the product. Id. at 198–99. For example, 
10
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B.  Traditional Intellectual Property Scholarship 
Patent scholars recognize that patent laws affect market transactions 
and thus can harm society; scholars and policymakers therefore try to 
design legal regimes that maximize the extent to which the benefits of 
patent rights exceed the costs.49 Traditional economics provides a 
framework for analyzing such benefits and costs and has become the 
dominant lens through which legal scholars evaluate the merits of patent 
law.50  
Under this approach, the main benefit of patent rights is that they 
provide financial incentives for inventors to discover, disclose, and 
commercialize new inventions.51 Building on the neoclassical assumption 
                                                                                                                     
markets may produce an inefficiently large volume of a product when firms are not liable for the 
environmental damage caused by manufacturing the product. In such a situation, the firms that 
pollute are able to externalize some of the costs associated with a product. Forcing firms to 
internalize those costs will raise firms’ marginal cost, thereby increasing both the market price for 
the good and overall social welfare. 
 49. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1813, 1825 & n.29, 1826 (1984). 
 50. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 4 (“Today it is acknowledged that analysis and 
evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework 
that seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency.”). Some scholars, however, 
have offered less economically focused justifications for patents. Id. at 5 (“We are skeptical that the 
noneconomic theories of intellectual property have much explanatory power or normative 
significance . . . .”); see, e.g., William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 371–73 
(2011) (arguing that patents promote social norms that foster invention). 
 51. A complete recitation of the scholarship regarding the use of patents as incentives to 
discover, disclose, and commercialize inventions is impossible because the literature is enormous, 
but examples include the following: MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 158 (2008) (describing the traditional view of patent law); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7 (2009) (“The idea behind the 
patent system is simple: invention is a ‘public good’ because it is expensive to invent but cheap to 
copy those inventions.”); F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 64–68 (6th ed. 2013); 
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 (4th ed. 
2007) (“Patent law provides a market-driven incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing the 
inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her invention.”); Dan L. Burk, Patenting 
Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1619–20 (1993); 
Lee, supra note 13, at 930 (noting certain trade-offs maintain “incentive[s] to invent”); Clarisa 
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 629 n.11 (2002) (collecting numerous citations to 
“literature modeling intellectual property in terms of rents and product markets,” and stating that a 
complete list of such citations “would be impossible here”); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing 
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377 (2010) (describing the “reward” of exclusive patent 
rights as a “dominant justificatory theor[y] of patent law” that “largely motivates current patent 
doctrine”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 467, 470 (2008) (“[D]iscussions of patent law and policy have for the most part 
remained rooted in the paradigm of commercial sale as motivation for invention, disclosure, and 
dissemination of technical advances”); Vertinsky, supra note 32, at 221–26. Although not the focus 
of the discussion of productive inefficiency in this Article, traditional scholars also recognize other 
benefits of patent rights. For example, some legal scholars contend that patent law creates 
11
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of profit maximization, legal scholars argue that an inventor will pursue 
patent rights at a level that effectively balances the costs and benefits borne 
by that individual in acquiring those rights.52 As a result, changes in the 
value of patent rights such as a change in patent term will prompt inventors 
and their employers to adjust their behavior.53  
Scholars have also relied on traditional economics to identify and 
analyze the costs stemming from exclusive patent rights and have divided 
these costs into three related categories. First and most importantly, many 
scholars focus their analyses on circumstances in which patent rights can 
disrupt the consummation of socially beneficial transactions. For example, 
patent scholars argue that exclusive patent rights can limit competition and 
allow firms to charge supra-competitive prices for their goods and services 
leading to allocative inefficiencies and deadweight losses.54 Facing higher 
prices, some consumers will be unable to obtain goods or services that 
would be affordable in a competitive market, and these foregone 
transactions would have increased social welfare.55 The costs to consumers 
from patent rights are sometimes substantial, such as when patents limit 
access to life-saving medical technologies. For example, by one estimate, 
                                                                                                                     
information-related positive externalities. See Long, supra, at 628, 648 (arguing that patents provide 
a signaling mechanism to sources of capital that a patent owner, typically a business, engages in 
significant research and development). Similarly, others assert that patents provide information that 
help to support pro-innovation social norms. Hubbard, supra note 50, at 390–403. 
 52. See, e.g., Long, supra note 51, at 630 (asserting that the conventional understanding of 
patent law posits that “[r]ational inventors will calculate the [potentially patentable] technology’s 
expected revenue stream ex ante and proceed accordingly”). On the other hand, the lure of valuable 
patent rights may also encourage rent-seeking behavior. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–60 (2005) (“[T]he prospect of intellectual 
property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior that is socially wasteful.”).  
 53. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 21; see also Kaplow, supra note 49, at 1825–26 
(noting the relationship between patent life and inventive activity).  
 54. Many scholars discuss the deadweight loss created by patents in consumer markets. See, 
e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (noting that patents “raise[] the cost of products to 
buyers” despite their incentive to inventors); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (arguing that patents are 
designed to create allocative inefficiencies); Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
969, 975 (2007) (asserting that deadweight loss will occur when consumers cannot afford a patent 
owner’s supra-competitive prices); Lee, supra note 13, at 929 (asserting that in consumer markets 
patents “produce deadweight loss and may even facilitate monopolies that cause significant 
allocative distortions” (footnote omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 996–1000 (1997) (noting that because of an 
intellectual property right in a product, “fewer people will buy the [product] than if it were 
distributed on a competitive basis”); Long, supra note 51, at 632 (stating that patents “redistribut[e] 
consumer surplus to producers”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 871 (“[P]roprietary control of 
technology tend[s] to cause ‘dead weight’ costs due to restrictions on use.”); David S. Olson, 
Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject 
Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 197 (2009) (same); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 358 & n.103 
(same); Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1737, 1748–49 (2011) (same). 
 55. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/5
2014] THE DEBILITATING EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 2057 
 
pharmaceuticals cost five to ten times more when protected by patents.56  
Scholars also contend that exclusive patent rights create allocative 
inefficiencies and deadweight losses in technology markets because 
granting one entity the exclusive right to a discovery can prevent future 
innovators from building upon it.57 Innovation is often a cumulative, 
evolutionary process and “some of the follow-on efforts of inventors could 
result in something not simply slightly different but significantly better 
than the patented technology.”58 In fact, because independent invention is 
not a defense to patent infringement,59 patents can deter competitors from 
investing in innovation in patent-rich fields.  
The second type of traditional economic cost that patent scholars 
frequently examine is the transaction cost related to the transfer of patent 
rights.60 Indeed, the transfer of patent rights can actually prevent some of 
                                                                                                                     
 56. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8. For more mundane consumer goods, however, the 
allocative inefficiency stemming from reduced transactions with consumers is often relatively small. 
F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 998–99 (1987). 
 57. Numerous scholars have examined the deadweight losses created by patents in technology 
markets. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (asserting that patents “can not only 
encourage innovation, they can also interfere with it”); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (“[P]atents are 
likely to generate . . . inefficient allocation of resources.”); Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1237–
38 (noting the detrimental impact of patents on the process of innovation); Lee, supra note 13, at 
929–30 (stating that “many commentators have observed” that “patents also introduce dynamic 
distortions that may dampen follow-on innovation”); Lemley, supra note 54, at 996–1000; Long, 
supra note 51, at 632 (asserting that when inventions are patented “not enough information will be 
used”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 869–70; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 358 & n.103 
(stating that patents “can stifle follow-on invention”). 
 58. Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 869–70; see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (“A 
patent gives its owner a legal right . . . to stop independent inventors from continuing to use ideas 
they developed themselves.”). At the same time, an over-abundance of patents can force competitors 
to engage in defensive patenting. For example, one competitor might obtain patents solely to be 
able to assert them in retaliation for patent claims by another competitor. Such patents can also be 
used to facilitate cross-licensing. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 59–60 (2004) (describing the practice of cross-licensing between major 
companies); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1505 (2001) (noting that “many companies obtain patents for reasons totally unrelated to litigation 
or licensing,” including “patent[ing] broadly to ‘hedge their bets’ if they are uncertain which 
patents are likely to have value ex post”).  
 59. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8. 
 60. A complete recitation of the scholarship discussing the transaction costs created by 
patents would be impractical here, but examples include: BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 140 
(arguing that “by the late 1990s litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries”); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 33 (“When there is 
a gross disparity in the value that the only competitors for a good attach to it, transaction costs are 
likely to be high as each competitor vies for the largest possible share of that value.”); Paul J. 
Heald, Transaction Costs and Patent Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 447, 
447 (2007) (evaluating how various proposals for patent law reform impact transaction costs); 
Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507 (discussing the costs of patent licensing and litigation); Merges & 
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the allocative inefficiencies and deadweight losses mentioned above.61 For 
instance, a patent owner may grant a license to a competitor to improve 
upon a patented technology, thereby reducing the deadweight losses 
produced by the patent in technology markets. However, such transactions 
can be difficult to consummate, thereby preventing some parties from 
obtaining rights to use a patented technology.62  
The final type of cost that patent scholars typically focus on is the cost 
of administering the patent system. This cost includes the public and 
private costs of obtaining patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office and the cost of enforcing patents through litigation.63 Indeed, some 
commentators contend that the costs of enforcing patents exceed the 
benefits in many sectors of the U.S. economy.64  
Many legal scholars consider the trade-off between the incentive effect 
of patents and these three types of costs to be the central challenge in 
designing effective patent laws.65 These scholars therefore strive to 
influence lawmakers to develop laws directed toward reducing these costs 
                                                                                                                     
Nelson, supra note 11, at 874–75; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 368–70 (discussing transaction 
costs associated with patents).  
 61. Cf. Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507 (“The cost of licensing without going to court is also 
dramatically lower than the cost of litigation.”); Long, supra note 51, at 635. 
 62. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. In fact, transaction costs for transferring 
patent rights tend to be high “because by definition [intellectual property] has no unique physical 
site.” See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 16; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 343–44 (noting that 
patent rights can give rise to “high bargaining costs”). 
 63. See, e.g., Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1227 (listing the private and social costs 
arising from invalid patents); Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507–09 (discussing the costs of patent 
litigation and licensing). Scholars have also argued that patents will sometimes generate additional 
costs. For example, patent rights may encourage researchers, particularly academics, to keep their 
work secret before they file for patents. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 183–84 (1987). 
 64. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 140 (asserting that “by the late 1990s 
litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries”). 
 65. A complete recitation of the scholarship addressing the balancing of incentives and 
traditional economic costs related to patents is impossible, but examples include: LANDES & 
POSNER, supra note 12, at 22 (“[Exclusive IP] rights reduce the demand for intellectual property by 
inserting a wedge between price and marginal cost, creating deadweight loss that must be balanced 
against the disincentive effects of denying the creator of such property a remedy against copiers.”); 
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 7–8; Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1106; Michael Abramowicz 
& John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 361–
62 (2008) (“After all, a central drawback of intellectual property rights is that they increase 
deadweight loss, as higher prices mean that some who value goods over marginal cost nonetheless 
will not purchase them.”); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618–19; Durham, supra note 54, at 975 (“Hence 
a successful patent system is one in which the public benefit created by encouraging technological 
advancement more than compensates for the price paid as a consequence of the patentee’s 
monopoly.”); Lemley, supra note 52, at 1059 (“By definition . . . the intellectual property system 
permits owners to raise price above marginal cost, creating deadweight losses by raising the price to 
consumers.”); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 346, 358 (discussing deadweight loss). 
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while maintaining robust incentives to innovate.66 This balance, however, 
is premised on the belief that the traditional neoclassical economic 
understanding of patent law comprehensively describes the benefits and 
costs of patent protection.67 The next Part of this Article examines whether 
this belief is warranted. 
II.  PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY 
The application of neoclassical economics to patent law is in many 
respects useful, but can also be misleadingly incomplete. Neoclassical 
economics assumes that “firms produce maximum output for given 
inputs . . . and, therefore, they are cost minimizers.”68 While this 
assumption greatly simplifies analyses, it does not always align with 
reality. In fact, many modern economists contend that firms often fail to 
maximize profits due to productive inefficiencies. 
A.  Sources of Productive Inefficiency  
In assuming that firms maximize profits, neoclassical economists 
ignored much of the internal workings of firms. In contrast, more recent 
economists more closely examine the conditions that exist within firms and 
argue that “only individuals think and act, and hence individuals are the 
proper units of investigation.”69 In focusing on individuals rather than the 
actors in the aggregate in firms, modern economists have identified 
numerous interrelated reasons that individuals fail to maximize both their 
own well-being and firm profits; four of these sources of productive 
inefficiency are germane to patent law.70  
                                                                                                                     
 66. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1106 (providing “a possible solution” to the sub-
optimal trade-off between incentivizing inventers and ensuring access to inventions); Burk, supra 
note 51, at 1618–19 (“[T]he societal costs the patent system generates must not be allowed to 
exceed the benefits of the intellectual goods it fosters.”). For instance, an invention may not be 
patented if it “would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(2012). Scholars have justified this basic rule of patent law on the grounds that awarding exclusive 
rights in such a situation would create a deadweight loss and allocative inefficiency. LANDES & 
POSNER, supra note 12, at 21. The scope of protection afforded to patents is also critical to 
optimizing the impact of patents on social welfare. This scope depends on numerous factors, 
including the duration, subject matter limitations, the bases for invalidating patent rights, and the 
remedies for infringement. See id. (discussing the limited duration of patents); Crouch, supra note 
15, at 141–42 (noting that policy makers must calibrate rights granted by patent protections, 
“making them strong enough to help induce innovation and development while limiting 
monopolistic problems”). Issues of patent scope and productive inefficiency are discussed in 
Section III.D. 
 67. See Vertinsky, supra note 32, at 221–26 (providing the common assumptions shared by 
the “mainstream theories of patents”). 
 68. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 9. 
 69. Id. at 63; see also id. at 201 (arguing that productive inefficiency “is a type of inefficiency 
that results from intrafirm (personal and interpersonal) activities rather than market activities”). 
 70. Other sources of productive inefficiency are not relevant to this Article because patent 
rights impact them only indirectly. For example, attaining sufficient size to realize meaningful 
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First, although neoclassical economics posits that humans are guided by 
a singular, well-defined profit motive, many modern economists contend 
that human action is the complex product of multiple, competing impulses 
and modes of thought. For example, psychologists, behavioral economists, 
and more recently some legal scholars contend that humans exhibit “two 
kinds of thinking, one that is intuitive and automatic, and another that is 
reflective and rational.”71 Reflective thought processes are largely consistent 
with the traditional assumption of profit maximization. When thinking 
reflectively, people carefully deduce answers and consider the merits of 
different alternatives.72 As a result, the reflective approach to decision-
making often encourages people to “adhere to standards, to strive for the 
maximum, and to strive by being calculating and attentive to details.”73 
This deliberative approach to making decisions, however, requires both 
time and effort. Often, individuals opt instead to make decisions using 
“automatic” approaches to reach decisions more quickly and with 
comparatively less effort.74 Unfortunately, the speed and ease of automatic 
decision-making often comes at a substantial cost: automatic decisions 
more often produce incorrect conclusions.75 Automatic decisions are often 
distorted by systematic biases—so-called “cognitive biases”—that prevent 
individuals from reaching accurate conclusions.76 Cognitive psychologists 
and behavioral economists have identified many types of cognitive biases 
and demonstrated that their effects are widespread.77  
For example, due to the “availability bias,” individuals miscalculate the 
likelihood of an event occurring because individuals often approximate the 
probability based on “how readily examples come to mind” rather than 
statistical estimation.78 The availability of examples, however, is often 
affected by factors unrelated to the frequency with which an event actually 
                                                                                                                     
economies of scale can increase the productive efficiency of firms. See Scherer, supra note 56, at 
1002–03.  
 71. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19. 
 72. Id. at 19–20 (noting that the “Reflective System is more deliberate and self-conscious”). 
 73. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 64; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 20 (noting 
that the reflective cognitive system is, inter alia, controlled, deductive, and rule-following). In this 
limited respect, modern scholars agree with traditional economists regarding the behaviors of 
individuals. 
 74. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 65, 75; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19–22 (“The 
Automatic System is rapid and is or feels instinctive, and it does not involve what we usually 
associate with the word thinking.”). 
 75. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 21–22 (noting that cognitive mistakes are 
often made because people rely too heavily on the automatic system).  
 76. Id. at 22–23. 
 77. See, e.g., FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 67–69 (discussing the cognitive biases known as 
representativeness, availability, and anchoring); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19–37 
(discussing several types of cognitive biases); Jaros, supra note 20, at 1979–80 (noting the 
cognitive errors resulting from various cognitive biases). 
 78.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 25. 
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occurs. For instance, some events, like plane crashes and murders, are 
particularly newsworthy and easy to remember. As a result, people often 
incorrectly believe that air travel is less safe than traveling by car or that 
homicide is more common than less publicized causes of death like 
suicide.79 In actuality, air travel is over seventy times safer than travelling 
by car for an equivalent distance and suicide is approximately twice as 
common as murder.80 
Another widely recognized cognitive bias is “loss aversion,” which 
arises when individuals weigh more heavily the harm from losing 
something than the gain from acquiring it.81 As a result of loss aversion, an 
individual may choose not to relinquish a less valuable asset even to gain 
something more valuable. Consequently, “[l]oss aversion helps produce 
inertia, meaning a strong desire to stick with your current 
holdings . . . . even when changes are very much in [the individual’s] 
interests.”82 Loss aversion is further complicated by the so-called 
“hyperbolic discounting” of future losses. Under traditional economics, 
individuals discount future gains and losses at a constant rate.83 Empirical 
studies indicate, however, that individuals discount future events at a much 
higher rate and value present costs and benefits substantially more than 
those in the future.84 As a result, individuals fail to delay gratification at the 
rate predicted by traditional economics.85 Behavioral economists assert that 
hyperbolic discounting helps to explain the existence of many problems 
involving excessive short-term consumption, including smoking and 
consumer debt.86 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 25 (noting that risks familiar to human cognition, such as acts of terrorism and 
homicide “will be seen as more serious than a risk that is less familiar”).  
 80. Bourree Lam, Suicide vs. Homicide by State, per 100,000, FREAKONOMICS, (Sept. 1, 2011, 
9:29 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/01/suicide-vs-homicide-by-state-per-100000/; 
Matthew Yglesias, Passenger Airplanes Are Amazingly Safe, SLATE, (July 6, 2013, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/07/06/passenger_airplanes_are_amazingly_safe.html. 
 81. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 33–34. 
 82. Id. at 34. Other well-known cognitive biases include the anchoring bias, the 
representativeness bias, the optimism bias, and the status quo bias. Id. at 23–24, 26–35. A full 
account of cognitive biases is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 83. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1396 n.114 (2004); see also 
Wright & Stone, supra note 30, at 1531. For example, neoclassical economics assumes that an 
individual would determine the value of receiving $1,000 ten years in the future by determining the 
amount of money that must be invested today in order to grow to $1,000 in ten years. If the interest 
rate for the next ten years is 5%, the present value of $1,000 is $613.91. 
 84. Bar-Gill, supra note 83, at 1396 (“Th[e] systematic disparity between people’s short-term 
and long-term discount rates has been consistently demonstrated both in the laboratory and in real-
world settings.”); id. at 1396 n.115 (collecting sources demonstrating the systematic disparity 
between short and long-term discount rates). 
 85. See Wright & Stone, supra note 30, at 1532.  
 86. Bar-Gill, supra note 83, at 1395–99; see Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is 
Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1293–94 (2001). 
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At times, people are aware of the costs and benefits of reflective and 
automatic decision-making and can choose between these approaches 
intelligently.87 For example, individuals may embrace self-paternalistic 
measures to prevent their automatic decision-making systems from 
undermining careful, reflective decisions, such as when a person who is 
dieting decides not to buy a tempting food rather than to buy it but eat less. 
Cognitive biases, however, are difficult to resist, particularly “when 
choices and their consequences are separated in time.”88 Ultimately, 
individuals make many decisions without carefully choosing between 
reflective and automatic approaches.89 
A second reason that individuals fail to maximize firm profits is that 
even when individuals intend to think rationally and carefully, they face 
substantial cognitive limitations. As Nobel Prize winning economist 
Herbert Simon observed more than fifty years ago, “[t]he capacity of the 
human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for 
objectively rational behavior in the real world . . . .”90 Many economists 
thus posit that humans exhibit at most “bounded rationality.”91 One 
important reason that humans are boundedly rational is that neurological 
structures and processes in the human brain create “rate and storage limits 
on the powers of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and process 
information without error.”92 Humans also face difficulties in translating 
ideas into forms that can be effectively communicated to others.93 Thus, 
the bounded rationality of humans most significantly affects decision-
making in situations involving complexity and uncertainty. For example, 
humans often have a poor intuitive grasp of statistics and probability, and 
consequently fail to effectively distinguish between patterns and 
randomness.94 Facing complexity and uncertainty, individuals therefore 
                                                                                                                     
 87. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 44.  
 88. Id. at 73. For example, many people fail to stick to their New Years’ resolutions.  
 89. Similarly, when facing a decision with significant emotional ramifications, individuals 
may make decisions based on those emotions and, once free from emotional strain, lament their 
moments of weakness. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 206 (“Sometimes we are tired, sometimes we 
are angry, jealous, afraid. We often . . . look back and regret the decisions we make.”). 
 90. SIMON, supra note 20, at 198 (emphasis omitted); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 
21 (positing that human behavior, while intended to be rational, is only limitedly so). 
 91. SIMON, supra note 20, at 198; WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 21. 
 92. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 21. 
 93. Id. at 22. 
 94. See generally LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS RULES 
OUR LIVES (2008) (describing the inability of many people to understand statistics or to recognize 
the effects of randomness); SCHERER, supra note 26, at 29–30 (noting that some economists argue 
that “many business people are poorly informed about business conditions in general, know almost 
nothing about the concept of probability, and understand only crudely the logic of profit 
maximization, i.e., what variables must be taken into account, such as marginal cost and marginal 
revenue, and how they must be related to maximize profits”); Crouch, supra note 15, at 161 (noting 
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employ simplifying strategies and heuristics.95 In doing so, however, 
“‘approximation must replace exactness in reaching a decision.’”96 While 
often useful, “heuristics can also lead to serious errors in judgment.”97 
When complexity and uncertainty force employees to use heuristics, errors 
are often inevitable and firms will accordingly fail to maximize profits.  
A third reason that individuals may prevent firms from maximizing 
profits stems from the individuals’ reliance on habits to determine their 
behavior.98 For instance, an employee may continue to utilize an approach 
to her job even after changes in the market or new technologies create 
opportunities for improvement. Of course, habits are not inherently 
inefficient. Habituated behavior may allow individuals to work more 
quickly and some habits can increase employee productivity, like double-
checking the accuracy of work. Maintaining less effective habits may also 
be justified when the cost of developing new, better habits requires a 
substantial investment of time and energy.99 For example, even if a new 
technology can theoretically increase firm profits, the costs of changing 
old, technologically outdated habits may exceed the benefits.100  
Despite the potential benefits of habituated behaviors, it is unlikely that 
employees always use habits in a cost-justified manner. In many cases, 
people decide to maintain habits using the automatic mode of decision-
making described above101 without effectively weighing the costs and 
benefits of that decision.102 Cognitive biases also limit the capacities of 
individuals to effectively rely on habits. For example, psychological 
studies demonstrate that individuals often exhibit a strong cognitive bias in 
favor of preserving the status quo, causing well-established bad habits to 
                                                                                                                     
that the “lottery effect” affects potential innovators, “causing them to exhibit the skewed preferences 
of the patent lottery and thus be willing to invest against the actuarial norm”). 
 95. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 37 (arguing that people adopt sensible “rules 
of thumb” to cope with questions in a complex world). 
 96. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 23 (quoting Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded 
Rationality, in 12 DECISION AND ORGANIZATION 170 (C. McGuire & R. Radner eds., 1972)). 
 97. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 67. 
 98. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 74–78; CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 132 (“A 
complex organization develops a set of routines that draw on decentralized knowledge and suffice 
as responses to the range of disturbances that ordinarily intrude.”). 
 99. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 121 (noting that employees may continue an activity 
because of the “sunk costs” invested in that activity). 
 100. See also id. (“The sunk costs in programs and facilities of ongoing projects thus insulate 
existing programs from displacement by alternatives which, were the current program not already in 
place, might otherwise be preferred.”). 
 101. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 43 (“In many situations, people put themselves 
into ‘automatic pilot’ mode, in which they are not actively paying attention to the task at hand. (The 
Automatic System is very comfortable that way.)”); see also id. (providing examples of resorting to 
routine or habit while operating under the automatic state of cognition).  
 102. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at xvii, 79. 
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persist.103 Further, it is often difficult for individuals to determine that a 
once-good habit has become ineffective due to changes in technological or 
market conditions, in part because humans often become desensitized to 
environmental stimuli and will not perceive environmental changes unless 
they exceed a sufficient magnitude.104 A final reason that employees will 
not maximize firm profits is that employees often pursue goals at work that 
conflict with the profit related objectives of the firm, such as on-the-job 
leisure, personal relationships, perquisites, power, and prestige.105 One 
important individual goal that frequently undercuts firm profits is an 
individual’s desire to conserve his or her own efforts.106 Such efforts in 
conservation may cause an individual to embrace automatic and intuitive 
decision-making processes when more conscientious decision-making 
would better serve the firm. Employees may also deliberately limit their 
efforts by shirking their responsibilities.107 Although shirking reduces firm 
profits, an employee enjoys the full benefit of reduced effort but only a 
portion of the cost because the losses from shirking are typically spread 
across the entire firm.108 Even diligent employees may not maximize firm 
profits if they strive to maximize value on a timetable that is shorter than 
                                                                                                                     
 103. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 34. 
 104. See id. at 34–35 (discussing status quo bias); FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 77–78. 
 105. See, e.g., CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 5, 65 (noting that the coalition of workers 
that comprises firms may falter ex post “through shirking other opportunistic behavior by some 
members of the coalition”); FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 38, 188 (describing trade-offs between 
employees’ on-the-job leisure and profits); LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 27 (explaining ways 
agents of firms will make decisions in their own interest); WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 119 
(discussing how internal social relations of a firm can undermine the profit-related goals of the firm 
in the procurement context); Merges, supra note 21, at 26 (noting that “employees will maximize 
their own utility, rather than their employer’s”); Posner, supra note 5, at 574–75 (describing reasons 
why a manager of a monopoly might divert firm resources to redecorating the corner office).  
 106. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 55 (asserting that “workers have effort discretion which makes 
their performance dependent upon motivation”). Employment contracts generally give employees 
some discretion over the amount of effort to apply to their jobs. See id. at 74 (providing that firms 
“buy labor time,” yet human effort “is not directly purchased”). Indeed, at the time of hiring, 
employers are often unable to describe in detail the specific tasks employees must perform, and 
instead must describe job responsibilities in broader, discretion-laden terms. See WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 15, at 124 (noting that “the joining of bounded rationality with uncertainty makes 
contractual completeness expensive (if not infeasible) to attain”); cf. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing legal indeterminacy). Moreover, firms are often unable to 
determine ex ante the output that an employee should produce based on given inputs. FRANTZ, 
supra note 17, at 55. 
 107. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 65 (noting the limits of employment contracts 
given shirking and opportunistic behavior).  
 108. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 90; Merges, supra note 21, at 22 & n.72 (discussing 
shirking). Conversely, an exceptionally diligent employee bears the entire cost of such industrious 
behavior but likely enjoys only a portion of any increased firm profits. The incentive structure 
facing employees and managers thus can be understood as a prisoner’s dilemma. When each 
individual adopts a rational maximization strategy, the result is an inferior outcome for all 
individuals. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 90–93. 
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the firm’s.109 For example, an employee may strive to maximize quarterly 
profits to please shareholders when the firm’s profits ultimately would be 
increased in the long-term by a strategy involving short-term losses.110 This 
view of employee motivation conflicts with traditional economic accounts: 
“In conventional [neoclassical economics] all economic activity takes 
place between principals, or, to the extent that agents exist, they are 
presumed to act entirely in accord with the interests of the principals.”111 
When employees pursue non-profit goals, firm profits suffer.112  
B.  Effects of Productive Inefficiency 
As described above, well-functioning markets generally enhance social 
welfare because voluntary transactions generate wealth in the form of 
consumer and producer surpluses.113 As a result, conditions that cause 
parties to consummate fewer transactions reduce the total welfare of 
society.114 For example, as recognized by traditional neoclassical 
economics, monopoly prices harm society because some consumers will be 
unable to afford them.115  
Although ignored by neoclassical economics, productive inefficiencies 
produce a similar reduction in social welfare. When firms suffer from 
productive inefficiencies, employees are less effective in turning inputs 
into outputs, and firms consequently face higher costs in producing goods 
and services. Such firms therefore produce smaller quantities and charge 
higher prices that some consumers cannot afford.116 As a result, when 
productive inefficiencies affect a large part of a market, they create a 
deadweight loss, which reduces social welfare.117 Importantly, the losses to 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Hyperbolic discounting exacerbates this problem. See supra notes 83–86 and 
accompanying text (discussing hyperbolic discounting). 
 110. See SCHERER, supra note 26, at 30 (theorizing that a monopolistic firm may not choose to 
exploit its monopoly power in order to build customer loyalty at expense of short term profits). 
 111. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 26–27. 
 112. Profit-sharing schemes can help to align the incentives of employees and their superiors, 
but “[e]ven the best-designed employee bonus and profit-sharing systems seldom succeed in 
instilling much zeal for profit maximization below the middle management level.” SCHERER, supra 
note 26, at 31. 
 113. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 114. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 159 (noting that taxation creates a disincentive for buyers 
to consume and sellers to produce, which then diminishes market size to a suboptimal level). 
 115. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Posner, supra note 5, at 577 (“[M]oney expended to hire more of the factors of 
production than actually needed to conduct a business diverts resources from more productive 
activities, and this effect is not only additive to, but could be many times greater than, the social 
cost in allocative inefficiency.”). 
 117. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. However, not all increased costs that firms 
face due to productive inefficiencies reduce social welfare because the firm’s loss is sometimes an 
employee’s gain. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 188 (explaining that employee leisure may 
represent a nontraded commodity enjoyed as utility by employees as firm “output”); Posner, supra 
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society stemming from productive inefficiencies are not merely theoretical, 
as numerous empirical studies have identified significant economic losses 
due to productive inefficiencies.118 One study estimates that losses due to 
productive inefficiencies are equal to as much as 20% of the U.S. 
economy.119 Additional empirical evidence regarding productive 
efficiencies is discussed below.120 
C.  Reducing Productive Inefficiency 
1.  Competition  
An important insight of the economic literature regarding productive 
inefficiency is that competition can substantially reduce the social harms of 
productive inefficiency.121 Robust competition reduces productive 
inefficiency in at least three interrelated ways.122 First, competition 
                                                                                                                     
note 5, at 575 (describing the benefit of “[m]anagerial self-indulgence” in the context of monopoly 
firms). For instance, when an employee shirks his responsibilities in order to take an extra break, the 
employee receives the benefit of on-the-job leisure time. It is unlikely, however, that employees 
value such “nontraded” commodities like on-the-job leisure time at a sufficiently high rate to 
completely offset the harm to firm profits. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 191–93. 
 118. See, e.g., FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 136 (providing examples of economic losses due to 
productive inefficiencies); THOMAS J. HOLMES & JAMES A. SCHMITZ, JR., FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS, COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY: A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 3 (2010) (reviewing 
numerous empirical studies and concluding that they demonstrate that “increased competition raised 
industry productivity”), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr439.pdf; Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition 
over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 598 (2002) (reviewing empirical studies confirming 
that “monopolies tend to produce less efficiently than players in a competitive market”); Gerla, 
supra note 17, at 224 (noting that empirical studies demonstrate that production inefficiency, 
otherwise known as “X-inefficiency,” indeed exists, and that firms suffer from production 
inefficiencies that are often severe); Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency,” 
56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 406 (1966) (“The main burden of these findings is that [productive 
inefficiency] exists, and that improvement in [productive efficiency] is a significant source of 
increased output.”). 
 119. Gerla, supra note 17, at 227. In contrast, some estimates of losses from allocative 
efficiency are small. For example, one economist has “estimated that the welfare loss due to 
monopoly power was approximately one-tenth of one percent of the U.S. gross national product.” 
FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 2; accord Leibenstein, supra note 118, at 392 (noting that empirical 
studies suggest that “the problem of allocative efficiency is trivial”). But see BOLDRIN & LEVINE, 
supra note 51, at 69 (“Although the current tendency in economics is to argue that the welfare 
triangle is not large, in the case of innovation this is not always true.”). 
 120. See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
 121. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 57 (arguing that competition can lead individuals to feel 
driven to realize potential); id. at 98; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 48 (noting that 
“markets provide self-control services”). 
 122. Lack of competition is not the only source of productive inefficiency. See CAVES, supra 
note 19, at 11–17 (discussing numerous sources of productive inefficiency); CAVES & BARTON, 
supra note 19, at 72–85 (describing various technical inefficiencies); Alison Green & David Mayes, 
Technical Inefficiency in Manufacturing Industries, 101 ECON. J. 523, 523 (1991) (discussing 
empirical studies regarding inefficiency across industries in the United Kingdom). Indeed, even in 
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eliminates productively inefficient firms from the market.123 Firms and 
business units within firms often vary in the nature and extent of their 
productive inefficiencies.124 For instance, the effects of cognitive biases on 
an employee are often affected by the “choice architecture” in which the 
employee makes decisions, including the default rules that apply in the 
absence of a decision, whether processes are designed to account for 
employee errors, and the mechanisms for providing feedback to employees 
after a decision has been made.125 Through competition, businesses with 
better choice architecture will push from the market rivals who suffer more 
from egregious cognitive biases.126 Similarly, firms likely differ in the 
extent to which employees can pursue goals that undermine employer 
profits. For example, some firms may offer generous perquisites like 
company cars and richly appointed or architecturally ambitious offices.127 
Competition may eliminate from the market—or at least reduce the market 
share of—these productively inefficient firms.128 Differerences in the 
                                                                                                                     
competitive industries, employees sometimes may choose to pursue their own objectives rather than 
tirelessly strive to maximize profits for their employers. A well-known example of this problem 
arises every year on “Cyber Monday,” when millions of employees shop online from their places of 
employment on the Monday after Thanksgiving. According to one study, 86% of employees 
planned to shop while at work on Cyber Monday in 2013, leading to an estimated productivity loss 
for employers valued at $2.5 billion. RetailMeNot Shoppers Trend Report: One in Four Consumers 
Plan to Spend at Least Half of Their Workday Shopping Online on Cyber Monday, RETAILMENOT 
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://retailmenot.mediaroom.com/2013-11-25-RetailMeNot-Shoppers-Trend-
Report-One-in-Four-Consumers-Plan-to-Spend-at-Least-Half-of-Their-Workday-Shopping-Online-
on-Cyber-Monday.   
 123. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 96 (“X-efficiency cannot continue unabated. Pressure 
mounts as costs increase and profits decrease, and/or the threat imposed by new competition creates 
a serious threat to jobs and incomes.”); HOLMES & SCHMITZ, supra note 118, at 7 (discussing the 
reallocation of market share from lower productivity enterprises to higher productivity enterprises). 
 124. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 68 (“In seeking productivity improvements and 
reacting to economic changes, the individual[] firms and plants in an industry continually perform 
experiments.”). Empirical productivity studies are consistent with this variability. For example, a 
study of 102 U.S. manufacturing industries found that the productivity in the top quartile of plants 
was at least 25% higher than the average for that industry. Id. at 2. Typically, the top quartile of 
plants was 65% more productive than the industry average. Id. 
 125. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 83–100 (explaining the six 
principles of “choice architecture”). 
 126. See id. at 252 (“Choice architecture, both good and bad, is pervasive and unavoidable, 
and it greatly affects our decisions.”). 
 127. One example of this type of productive inefficiency may be lavish corporate facilities. For 
example, Apple, Inc. has announced plans to create a futuristic new corporate campus at a cost of 
approximately $5 billion. Peter Burrows, Inside Apple’s Plans for Its Futuristic, $5 Billion 
Headquarters, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-04-04/apples-campus-2-shapes-up-as-an-investorrelations-nightmare. 
 128. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 68 (“External competition limits this 
opportunism because the presence of efficient rivals (or the threat of their entry) constrains the 
amount of slack a firm’s participants can absorb . . . .”); SCHERER, supra note 26, at 38 (“No matter 
how strongly managers prefer to pursue other objectives, and no matter how difficult it is to find 
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internal hierarchical structure and organizational schemes of some firms 
may facilitate supervision by management and reduce productive 
inefficiencies of employees.129 Through competition, those firms with 
more effective internal structures will predominate.  
Second, competition reduces productive inefficiency by increasing the 
information exchange between rivals.130 For example, the success of 
competitors may help a firm to identify circumstances in which its 
employees are underperforming, perhaps because employees are pursuing 
personal goals that undermine firm profits. As employees move between 
firms, superior organizational structures and choice architectures may also 
be shared.131 Furthermore, success or failure in competing with rivals may 
provide employees with information regarding the consequences of their 
decisions, and such feedback can help employees to address poor decision-
making stemming from cognitive biases and bounded rationality.132 
Competitive threats can also reveal the inefficacy of old habits and the 
costs of decisional inertia, prompting employees to be more alert and cost-
conscious.133 “Wherever competition is absent, there is a disposition to rest 
content with old methods, not to say slack ones.”134 
                                                                                                                     
profit-maximizing strategies in a world of uncertainty and high information costs, failure to satisfy 
this criterion means ultimately that a firm will disappear from the economic scene.”); Posner, supra 
note 5, at 575 (“A management not forced to reduce costs to the bone in order to survive is free to 
take a more strategic attitude toward corporate and personal destiny than one constrained by the 
market to pursue cost minimization and immediate profit maximization.”). 
 129. For example, large peer groups may be particularly subject to collective action problems 
and may also face increased costs in distributing information to their members. MANCUR OLSON, 
JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53–65 (1965) 
(discussing the increased effectiveness of small groups of people); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 
15, at 45–47 (discussing various constraints on peer groups). Hierarchy can ameliorate some of 
these concerns. Id. at 47.  
 130. See CAVES, supra note 19, at 9 (“[W]hen the number of market participants is small, there 
are fewer agents to experiment and try for improved ways of doing things, and fewer peers from 
whom to learn.”); CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 68–69 (arguing that competitors increase 
technical efficiency by engaging in diffusion of information); SCHERER, supra note 26, at 38 
(“[K]nowledge that only the fit will survive provides a potent incentive for all firms to adapt their 
behavior in profit-maximizing directions, learning whatever skills they need and emulating 
organizations that succeed in the survival game.”); Posner, supra note 5, at 574 (“Under 
competition, a firm either learns from its most efficient rival or goes under; either way production 
ends up at the least-cost level.”). 
 131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing choice architecture). 
 132. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 75 (“Learning is most likely if people get 
immediate, clear feedback after each try.”). 
 133. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 96. 
 134. Arthur Twining Hadley, The Good and Evil of Industrial Combination, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1897, at 383. Judge Learned Hand made a similar and more detailed observation 
more than sixty years ago: “Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power 
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a 
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is 
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Third, competition can reduce productive inefficiencies by deterring 
employees from pursuing individual goals that undermine firm profits. 
When individual contributions do not significantly affect the firm’s 
success, an employee may be inclined to engage in selfish behavior.135 
Facing competition, however, an employee’s selfish behavior may impact 
the firm more significantly, and the cost to the employee from a wage 
reduction or loss of employment may outweigh the benefits to the employee 
from opportunistic behavior.136 Similarly, facing robust competition and the 
resulting threat to the firm’s survival, managers may be less reluctant to engage 
in the critical supervision necessary to increase productivity even if such 
supervision strains interpersonal relationships, requires additional effort, and 
exposes managers to greater scrutiny by higher level management.137 When 
competition threatens the firm, employees may also be more receptive to 
managerial supervision even if those employees do not otherwise enjoy the 
changes wrought by management.138 Therefore, “competition reduces the 
opportunity to engage in the various forms of discretionary behavior 
available to (some) employees of the monopolist, including behaving in an 
arbitrary sloppy, bureaucratic, arrogant, and nonresponsive fashion.”139  
                                                                                                                     
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.” United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 135. See OLSON, supra note 129, at 62 (arguing that individuals in large, latent groups will 
likely not be influenced by social incentives to obtain the common good). 
 136. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 242–43 (noting that without competition “the management 
and workers in the firm [may] take part of their rewards as on-the-job leisure”). In a sense, 
competition causes employees to internalize part of the cost of the productive inefficiency that the 
employee imposes on the firm. Competition among employees may reduce opportunistic behavior 
as one employee’s diligence reveals the opportunism of another. Id. at 27 (“[R]ivalry among large 
numbers of bidders will render opportunistic inclinations ineffectual. Parties who attempt to secure 
gains by strategic posturing will find . . . that such behavior is nonviable.”). However, social 
interactions among employees may reduce this form of competition. Peer pressure can encourage 
harder working employees to reduce their efforts because one individual can “make others look bad 
by working too hard.” FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 87; see also LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 33 
(noting that peers “are likely to impose themselves on the more energetic workers in the firm, to 
reduce their norms towards somewhat lower levels and to increase the levels for especially 
unenergetic individuals”). 
 137. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 59 (arguing that individuals within organizations will be 
more likely to forego greater effort where competition is light and forego leisure when competition 
is high); Gilbert, supra note 26, at 205 (suggesting that competition may make firms attune to 
inefficient outputs by employees). As Adam Smith observed more than two centuries ago, 
“[m]onopoly . . . is a great enemy to good management.” ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 147 
(Random House, 1937). 
 138. See, e.g., FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 102 (noting a change in attitude among employees 
whose plant faced shutdown); id. at 59 (“[I]n situations where competitive pressures are high, and 
hence the costs of [trading disutility of greater effort for leisure] are also high, they will exchange 
less of the disutility of effort for the utility of freedom from pressure . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); HOLMES & SCHMITZ, supra note 118, at 17–21 (providing examples of employees and 
employee-unions accepting management-directed change in the face of increasing competition in 
the iron ore manufacturing industry). 
 139. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 98. 
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Empirical studies confirm that heightened competition can reduce 
productive inefficiencies, thereby increasing the productivity of firms.140 
Studies of early shipping industries, the U.S. iron industry, and the U.S. 
cement industry have found that increased competition led to significant 
productivity improvements as employees became more receptive to 
managerial supervision that granted the employees less on-the-job leisure 
time.141 Other empirical studies have reported that competition increased 
productivity by encouraging investment in new technologies and by 
eliminating low-productivity firms from the market.142 Similarly, empirical 
studies of trade liberalization have found that reductions in tariffs often 
increase the productivity of domestic firms.143 Most significantly, broad-
based studies of productive efficiency in many different countries have 
confirmed that a lack of competition often exacerbates productive 
inefficiencies.144  
Increased competition thus can improve productive efficiency and 
increase social welfare. Nevertheless, firms are often reluctant to support 
policies that would intensify competition. Although intensified competition 
may make a firm more productively efficient, that same competition could 
reduce the firm’s profits if the firm loses market share due to increased 
competition.145 Similarly, competition may undermine the job security or 
compensation of individual employees. For instance, employees who enjoy 
substantial on-the-job leisure and perquisites may not want to lose those 
benefits to increased competition. Even firms that do not lose market share 
may be reluctant to embrace greater competition if it leads to reduced 
prices and thus lower firm profits.146 As a result, some employees and 
firms may seek to improve productive inefficiency through a different 
mechanism: managerial supervision.  
                                                                                                                     
 140. Scherer, supra note 56, at 1004 & n.16. 
 141. HOLMES & SCHMITZ, supra note 118, at 14–22, 25–26.  
 142. Id. at 23, 27–28. 
 143. Id. at 29–33. 
 144. CAVES, supra note 19, at 11–12 (discussing effects of external and domestic competition). 
But see Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital Mergers, 31 
HOUS. L. REV. 813, 830–32 (1994) (asserting that the prevalence of productive inefficiencies in the 
context of monopolies is “based more upon intuition than empirical evidence”). Empirical studies 
also indicate that competition promotes competitiveness in global markets. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, 
THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 117 (1990) (“In global competition, successful firms 
compete vigorously at home and pressure each other to improve and innovate.”). Some empirical 
studies indicate that increases in competition can reduce firm productivity when increased market 
concentration is required to achieve greater economies of scale. CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 
69; FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 167–68. Firm productivity, however, is distinct from productive 
inefficiency, and some empirical studies of productive inefficiency therefore try to control for 
considerations of scale. CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 67. 
 145. For example, if competitors enjoy greater gains in productive efficiency a less 
productively efficient firm may be weeded out of the market. 
 146. In such a situation, the consumer surplus would increase. See supra notes 40–44 and 
accompanying text. 
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2.  Limits on Managerial Supervision 
Undoubtedly, managers can encourage employees to work more 
effectively through supervision, threats of termination, and financial 
inducements.147 However, the capacity of management to reduce 
productive inefficiency is often limited because productive inefficiencies 
affect managers as well as employees. Managers often suffer from 
cognitive biases and bounded rationality, rely on outdated habits and 
technologies, and pursue nonprofit objectives like power, prestige, and on-
the-job leisure.148  
Indeed, managers may face additional challenges in gathering accurate 
information regarding the activities of their subordinates. Managers are 
often unable to determine ex ante the output that an employee should 
produce based on given inputs,149 and when managers supervise numerous 
employees who all perform complex tasks, problems of bounded 
rationality are particularly likely to hamper efforts to gather information 
regarding the performance of those subordinates.150 Moreover, employees 
often strive to conceal their mistakes and opportunistic behavior from their 
managers.151 Furthermore, when managers rely on inaccurate information, 
subordinates may be reluctant to disagree and provide more accurate 
information due to concerns that the manager will react negatively to the 
correction.152 Even when a manager knows that an employee is shirking, 
the manager may pursue the nonpecuniary goal of harmonious 
interpersonal relationships by avoiding the conflict-laden task of 
reprimanding the subordinate.153 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 84 (assuming that “vertical relations” exert pressure for 
effort and that employees receive satisfaction from approval from supervisors); LEIBENSTEIN, supra 
note 17, at 29 (“The main reason for emphasizing the contrast between effort positions and effort 
points is the nature of the signals received by an employee . . . indicating varying demands for 
effort. When heeded, such signals, as usually interpreted, trigger what the individual believes to be 
the appropriate effort response or one that he likes to give.”); WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 54 
(discussing the effects of employment hierarchy). 
 148. See supra Section II.A; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 126–27 (noting that 
managers suffer from bounded rationality). 
 149. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 55 (“[Managers] do[] not always know in advance the quantity 
of output which will be received from given inputs and input ratios.”). 
 150. “Bounded rationality gives rise to finite spans of control together with the specialization 
of communication and decision-making functions.” WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 126 (footnote 
omitted). As a result, as firms grow in size, a “control loss phenomenon” arises. Id.(internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord SCHERER, supra note 26, at 31 (“The more hierarchical filters 
through which information passes, the more distorted the information is likely to become . . . .”). 
 151. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 9, 26, 122. Even mid-level managers may “conceal or 
gloss over operating problems until the situation has deteriorated beyond repair.” SCHERER, supra 
note 26, at 31. 
 152. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 122 (noting that subordinates “may tell their supervisor 
what he wants to hear; assertively, they will report those things they want him to know”). 
 153. See SCHERER, supra note 26, at 31–32. Furthermore, managerial oversight may produce 
counterproductive results because close supervision can undermine employee motivation due to the 
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In light of these manifold challenges in supervising employees, 
managers may evaluate employee performance by focusing on aspects of a 
job that are more amendable to quantification but do not fully reflect an 
employee’s contribution to the employer’s commercial success.154 For 
example, a managing partner in a law firm may focus on the number of 
hours that a young associate attorney bills rather than the quality of the 
associate’s work during those hours. Such an approach to supervision 
encourages employees like the associate attorney to focus on the measured 
aspect of their responsibilities to the detriment of other aspects of their jobs 
that are important to firm profits but more difficult to quantify.155 Indeed, 
social scientists have demonstrated that merely measuring a behavior can 
affect its frequency.156 One particularly problematic aspect of this 
phenomenon arises when failure is easier to measure than success.157 An 
employee in such a situation will discount the benefits of success and 
overreact to the costs of failure.158 Consequently, the employee may 
become excessively risk averse and avoid taking otherwise cost-justified 
risks.159 Similarly, employees who encounter failure due to factors beyond 
                                                                                                                     
“dissatisfaction of not being one’s own master.” FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 86, 99; see WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 15, at 55 (noting that hierarchies may be disruptive because “transparent inequality of 
rank [is] considered objectionable by some individuals” and “auditing and experience-rating may 
offend their sense of individual and collective well-being”); Merges, supra note 21, at 28 (noting 
that managerial scrutiny of researchers can be “counterproductive”). Some managers may be more 
successful in navigating these difficulties than others, but identifying and promoting such high-
quality managers can be difficult due to productive inefficiencies at higher levels of management. 
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 52, 230 (“Many managers are involved, but the exceptional ones 
can be discerned only with difficulty.”); see also id. at 24 (“If the specialization of labor is feasible, 
those whose rationality limits are less severely constrained than others are natural candidates to 
assume technical, administrative, or political leadership positions—which is to say that a hierarchy 
can emerge on this account.”). 
 154. See Merges, supra note 21, at 3 (“[P]rincipal-agent theory . . . demonstrates that when 
employees are assigned to multiple tasks . . . managers must take care lest employee compensation 
be tied too closely to one measurable task.”). 
 155. See id. at 29 (stating that if one of the multiple tasks assigned by management “pays better 
than the others, that task will get an inordinate amount of the employees’ attention” and that this 
dynamic can have a “detrimental effect on teamwork”). 
 156. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 70 (discussing the “mere-measurement effect”). 
For example, merely asking people whether they intend to floss will increase the likelihood that 
those people will in fact floss their teeth. Id.  
 157. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 121 (positing that “it may be impossible . . . to easily 
distinguish between faulty and meritorious internal performance”). 
 158. The loss-aversion bias further exacerbates this tendency. See supra notes 81–82 and 
accompanying text. Other cognitive biases, however, may temper this effect. See THALER & 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 31–32 (describing the “optimism bias” under which individuals are 
“unrealistically optimistic”).  
 159. One way to mitigate these types of problems is to uncouple compensation from 
performance. For example, “corporate R&D personnel generally receive their salary whether or not 
a particular line of research pans out. They do not give back their salary when an experiment goes 
awry or a product design proves unworkable.” Merges, supra note 21, at 31. On the other hand, 
when compensation is not tied to performance, shirking is more likely to occur. 
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their control may “press for program extensions beyond objectively 
rational cut-off limits in the hopes that the environment will change and 
‘save’ their reputations.”160 
III.  PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY AND PATENTS 
Although modern economic models consider the sources and effects of 
productive inefficiency, legal scholars and lawmakers have failed to apply 
these advances in economics to patent law. As a result, expanding the 
analysis of the economic apects of patent law to include considerations of 
productive inefficiency provides new insight into the development of 
effective patent law.  
A.  General Concerns 
Due to the limitations of managerial supervision, competition is vital to 
limiting productive inefficiencies. Unfortunately, patents often inhibit 
competition.161 For instance, patents may provide exclusive rights to 
technology that is critical to competing in an industry, like the active 
ingredients in some pharmaceuticals.162 Patents can also limit competition 
when they cover technology that is incorporated into an industry 
standard.163 After a certain technology becomes part of an industry 
                                                                                                                     
 160. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 121.  
 161. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (“[P]atents represent a significant 
departure from the norm of market competition. A patent gives its owner a legal right not only to 
prevent others from copying her idea but even the right to stop independent inventors from 
continuing to use ideas they developed themselves.”). Often times, patents have little effect on 
competition. Indeed, many patents have little economic effect because they are never licensed or 
otherwise commercialized. See infra Subsection III.C.1. Other times, patents provide only short-
lived protection from competition because competitors can develop non-infringing market 
substitutes. See Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (“Unlike the true monopolist, patent holders may well 
face a marketplace containing a variety of substitutes for their product, and be forced to price their 
products competitively.”); Gilbert, supra note 26, at 163 (“Patent protection does not guarantee that 
the inventor will be able to prevent competition from others, either legally by inventing-around the 
new technology, or illegally by infringing the patent.”). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
held that “a patent does not necessarily confer market power” for antitrust purposes. Ill. Tool Works 
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006). 
 162. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, at xv (2012) (describing the modern view of 
patents as property that set “boundary-based” restrictions on use); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 
(noting that, in some instances, patents may confer a virtual monopoly on holders, which monopoly 
generates inefficiencies common to monopolies). The market power created by patents may be 
higher in areas of rapid technological change. See Raymond Hartman et al., Assessing Market 
Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 317, 319 (1993).  
 163. Industry standards cover a wide variety of products, including mobile phones, 
semiconductors, and personal computers. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1893, 1903, 1946 (2002). These patents are 
often described as “‘standards-essential’ patents” or “SEPs.” Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, 
Patents, and the National Smart Grid, 32 PACE L. REV. 641, 655 (2012). By definition, firms in a 
standards-based industry cannot avoid infringing SEPs. Because of the competitive problems that 
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standard, competitors must use the patented technology even though 
alternate technologies were available before the establishment of the 
industry standard.164 Even patents on technologies that are not central to an 
industry and thus protect only one way of competing can affect rivalry by 
raising costs for competitors who accidentally infringe these patents.165 For 
example, one firm may invest substantial resources in developing a 
technology only to learn later that the technology infringes a rival’s patent. 
Because independent invention is not a defense to patent infringement,166 
the infringing firm may consider switching to a different technology to 
avoid patent liability. “Even when non-infringing alternatives are 
technologically possible, however, switching technologies” may be 
commercially infeasible.167 Moreover, even if there are many potential 
substitutes for patented technology on the market, the first company to 
reach the market may enjoy a dominant position due to first mover effects. 
For example, although some drugs use similar active ingredients, the first 
one to reach the market may dominate for many years.168 
As described earlier, competition is often critical to limiting productive 
inefficiencies.169 As a result, when patents limit competition, they promote 
productive inefficiencies and thus reduce social welfare.170 Therefore, 
policy makers should consider the effects of patents on productive 
                                                                                                                     
can arise with industry standards, many standard-setting organizations seek to use private 
agreements to limit the capacity of patent owners to undermine competition. See generally Lemley, 
supra, at 1957–68 (suggesting changes to rules enacted by standard-setting organizations so as to 
provide clarification, specificity, and fairness). 
 164. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 86 (describing how one firm can hijack an 
industry standard at the expense of the industry by “trying to collect fees from other chip makers 
that have successful designs”). Changing standards after they have been established can be 
expensive. Id. at 86–87. 
 165. Such patents are common. See Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 43 n.4; BOHANNAN & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 162, at xv. In some instances, patents might not affect competition because 
competitors can “invent around” the patented technology, that is, deveop non-infringing 
alternatives. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1313 (2009) 
(providing statistics regarding the “[e]ase of inventing around” patents in various enumerated 
industries); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 802–03 (1987). 
 166. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 67 n.11. 
 167. See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1931 (discussing difficulties in switching technologies); 
see also Jorge L.Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent 
Pledges, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309023. 
 168. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 26, at 202 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of 
ACE-inhibitor drugs). 
 169. See supra Subsection II.C.1. 
 170. See Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (arguing that patents generate inefficiencies similar to 
those create by monopolies and that those inefficiencies tend to generate higher prices, restrict 
supplies, and cause the inefficient allocation of resources); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 
(“So patents can not only encourage innovation, they can also interfere with it.”).  
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inefficiencies in designing patent laws.171 All things being equal, 
strengthening patent rights will insulate innovators from competition and 
thus foster productive inefficiency. Conversely, “[t]o the extent that 
competition increases, an increase in [productive efficiency] would be 
predicted.”172  
Although productive inefficiency has been overlooked in the 
development of modern patent law, it is particularly relevant today for at 
least three reasons. First, since the late 1970s patent rights in the United 
States have grown steadily stronger and stronger patent rights reduce 
competition to a greater extent.173 For example, although both courts and 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office once considered software and 
business methods ineligible for patent protection, software and business 
method patents are common today following a favorable decision by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.174 Although some aspects of 
U.S. patent protections have tempered in recent years,175 U.S. law still 
provides the strongest form of patent protection in the world.176 
Importantly, during this period of increasing patent strength, policy makers 
and scholars have not considered the effects of changes to patent law on 
productive inefficiency but have instead focused only on traditional 
economic concerns.177  
Second, productive inefficiency problems may be more pronounced 
among innovators than elsewhere in the economy. As economists Michele 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12 at 294–96 
(discussing factors impacting the scope of patent protection). In contrast to patent scholars, 
productive inefficiency economists have argued that “government regulation, by sheltering the firm 
from competitive pressure, may create an environment in which either managerial or non-
managerial employees are only selectively rational, that is, [productively] inefficient.” FRANTZ, 
supra note 17, at 202. 
 172. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 116. 
 173. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 13. 
 174. See, e.g., State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373, 
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 
578–79 (1999). 
 175. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3216, 3229−30  (2010) (providing a narrow 
holding that the “petitioners’ claims [were] not patentable processes because they [were] attempts to 
patent abstract ideas”). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act weakened the rights provided by 
U.S. patent law in some respects. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). For example, the Act 
expanded the universe of materials that could be used to invalidate a patent. Compare 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)(1) (2006) (denying patent protection if an invention was “known or used by others in this 
country, or patented or described in printed publication in this or a foreign country”), with 35 
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (denying patent protection if an invention was “patented, described in a 
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention”). Moreover, the America Invents Act expanded the 
defenses to patent infringement based on “prior use rights.” Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1962. 
 176. See GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHARTING THE COURSE 
30 (2d ed. 2014) (finding that the United States ranks first among twenty-five countries in “the 
strength of . . . environment[s] for patents, related rights, and limitations”).  
 177. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text. 
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Boldrin and David Levine have observed, “not all innovators and managers 
are the clever, intelligent individuals usually assumed in economic theory. 
In the history of innovation, examples abound of innovators who, far from 
maximizing their monopoly profits, have achieved closer to the 
minimum.”178 Careful management often cannot offset these shortcomings 
because monitoring research and development activities and measuring 
related productivity are “both notoriously difficult (and perhaps 
counterproductive) managerial tasks.”179 Moreover, when obtaining 
patents, innovating firms often must retain legal services, and managers 
charged with monitoring those services face additional challenges, 
particularly if those managers lack legal training.180 Likewise, technology 
startups often rely on outside investors with different goals than the 
entrepreneurs that manage the company, and those investors may be unable 
to monitor effectively the activities of the managing entrepreneurs.181 
Third, concerns over productive inefficiency are particularly important 
today because of the effect of productive inefficiency on the 
competitiveness of firms in global markets. Firms suffering from 
productive inefficiencies fail to utilize their resources to maximum profit-
making and thus cannot compete effectively against more productively 
efficient international rivals.182 Unfortunately, although the 
competitiveness of U.S. firms in international markets is vital to U.S. 
economic prosperity, by many measures U.S. competitiveness has declined 
in recent years.183 When U.S. patents limit competition in the United States 
                                                                                                                     
 178. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 87. On the other hand, fostering maximum 
rationality may not be ideal for encouraging invention. Like other creative endeavors, 
conventionalism and reasonableness may undermine innovative thought processes. 
 179. Merges, supra note 21, at 28; see Sichelman, supra note 51, at 360–61 (describing the 
risks and costs associated with commercialization of an invention, including but not limited to: 
“costly and risky scientific testing, market testing, market research, and marketing”). 
 180. See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-
Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 168 (2005). 
 181. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical 
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 124 n.60 (2010) (noting the existence of a 
principal–agent problem when “the entrepreneur engages in investments to maximize both her 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains, while the investor is only interested in the former”). 
 182. See, e.g., CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing the decline in competitiveness 
of U.S. manufacturing and arguing specifically that “U.S. productivity levels came to be matched 
and exceeded at the same time the superior quality and/or more innovative designs of some foreign 
manufactures became widely evident”). 
 183. Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1914–17. For example, the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
measures competitiveness using an analysis of numerous factors related to competiveness, including 
the quality of education and training, the efficiency of labor and capital markets, infrastructure, 
technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation. In 2007 and 2008, the United 
States topped the WEF competitiveness rankings. Thereafter, however, the United States began to 
drop in the rankings, slipping to second in 2009, fourth in 2010, fifth in 2011, and seventh in 2012. 
KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, at 13 
(2012); KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2010–2011, at 
15 (2010); Kai Bucher, US Competitiveness Ranking Continues to Fall; Emerging Markets Are 
Closing the Gap, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.weforum.org/news/us
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and increase productive inefficiency, they can undermine the 
competitiveness of U.S. firms in global markets.184  
B.  Quantifying Productive Inefficiency from Patents 
As described above, many economists have empirically verified that 
increased competition can reduce productive inefficiencies.185 
Unfortunately, these economic studies did not explicitly consider the effect 
of patent protection on productive inefficiencies, but when patents limit 
competition the effects on productive inefficiency are likely to be similar to 
those identified by modern economists.  Nevertheless, there are at least two 
further issues that warrant consideration in evaluating the magnitude of 
productive inefficiencies stemming from patent protection.  
1.  The Complex Effects of Patent Protection 
When patents limit competition, they may increase productive 
inefficiency186 and thus reduce social welfare. Patents, however, affect 
competition and social welfare in many other respects as well. In fact, 
patents can sometimes increase competition. For example, the protections 
of exclusive patent rights may encourage a technologically lagging firm or 
a new entrant to develop technology to compete with dominant 
incumbents.187 Moreover, even when patents reduce competition, they can 
increase social welfare if the value of a new invention overshadows any 
costs stemming from reduced competition.188 For example, when a patent 
prompts the discovery of a drug that cures an otherwise terminal illness, 
the patent likely increases social welfare even if it fosters productive 
inefficiencies. Similarly, a new manufacturing process may substantially 
increase a firm’s productivity even if a patent on the process substantially 
affects competition. 
Even though patents do not always limit competition, they often do so. 
Indeed, in order to generate meaningful incentives to invent, patents must 
                                                                                                                     
competitiveness-ranking-continues-fall-emerging-markets-are-closing-gap. In 2013, matters 
improved slightly, with the WEF ranking the United States fifth in global competitiveness. KLAUS 
SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014, at 15 (2013). 
 184. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 111 (“Import competition (measured by imports’ 
share of total supply) increases efficiency in industries whose domestic producers are 
concentrated.”). However, international competition likely does not improve productive inefficiency 
as robustly as domestic competition. CAVES, supra note 19, at 12; see also PORTER, supra note 144, 
at 117–24 (arguing that domestic rivalry increases the competitiveness of firms in global markets); 
Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1942–43 (arguing that patents that undermine domestic rivalry can 
reduce the competitiveness of U.S. firms in global markets).  
 185. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 54–62, 161–70 and accompanying text. 
 187. Gilbert, supra note 26, at 174. 
 188. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 379–80 (suggesting that patent holders may 
exploit society’s scarce resources as efficiently as possible). 
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limit competition to a certain extent.189 Discovering new inventions often 
requires substantial investment of time, effort, and money, and inventors 
and investors recover these expenditures by raising the prices for their 
goods and services.190 When patents do not affect competition, competitors 
can charge lower prices than the patent owner for similar goods or services 
because the competitors do not need to recover any resources invested in 
the initial discovery.191 In such a situation, the patent owner cannot recover 
the investment in the development of the new invention. 
More generally, although patents can increase social welfare in some 
respects, they also can generate welfare-reducing productive 
inefficiencies.192 Scholars and policy makers therefore should consider all 
costs and benefits when designing effective patent laws. At the very least, 
productive inefficiency is as relevant to the design of effective patent laws 
as allocative inefficiency.193 Both productive inefficiency and allocative 
inefficiency are byproducts of patents that limit competition, and patent 
scholars universally agree that patents at least sometimes sufficiently 
impact competition to generate allocative inefficiencies. By the same logic, 
scholars and policy makers should also consider the effect of patents on 
productive inefficiency.  
2.  The Schumpeter–Arrow Debate 
The argument that weakening patent protection can increase firm 
productivity raises issues addressed in a long-running debate among 
economists regarding the effect of competition on innovation. As described 
in more detail below, this debate has been largely inconclusive, and such 
indeterminacy in the economic literature might suggest that the effect of 
competition on productive efficiency is likewise indefinite. This 
Subsection rebuts this argument.  
Joseph Schumpeter championed one side of the economic debate, 
arguing that competition undermines innovation.194 Schumpeter asserted 
that in competitive markets firms might be reluctant to invest in projects 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (noting that while “all patents represent some restraint 
on trade,” patents are designed as such because “otherwise, individuals may not produce the good at 
all”); Lemley, supra note 54, at 996 (“Indeed, intellectual property rights must permit prices to rise 
above marginal cost in some cases if they are to have their intended effect of providing an incentive 
to create.”). 
 190. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 376–77. 
 191. See id. at 376 (noting variation between monopolistic and competitive pricing).  
 192. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (“Patents are, in fact, specifically designed to 
create such [monopolistic] inefficiencies . . . .”). 
 193. Some economists indicate, however, that limits on competition that do not trigger 
antitrust liability may nevertheless produce productive inefficiencies. CAVES & BARTON, supra note 
19, at 111 (stating that the level of competition that maximizes productive efficiency occurs “below 
the range in which oligopolistic behavior appears to become significant”). 
 194. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 162, at 8 (describing Schumpeter’s argument that 
monopoly tends to foster innovation while competition tends to retard it); Jonathan B. Baker, 
Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 578 
(2007). 
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that will convey significant benefits to competitors, like basic scientific 
research.195 Moreover, economic conditions in some industries also favor 
monopolies because of the benefits of economies of scale.196 For example, 
smaller firms find it difficult to compete in the pharmaceutical industry in 
part because the cost of developing a new drug may be as high as $800 
million.197  
Economist Kenneth Arrow disagreed with Schumpeter, arguing that 
competition promotes innovation better than monopoly.198 Oftentimes, 
Arrow noted, the monopolist faces little incentive to innovate because a 
new innovation would not increase the monopolist’s market share.199 
Rather, the monopolist’s sales of a new product may simply replace the 
monopolist’s existing sales. As Steve Jobs observed in 2004, “[W]hat’s the 
point of focusing on making the product even better when the only 
company you can take business from is yourself?”200 With competition, 
firms are encouraged to innovate because sales of a highly innovative 
product can increase a firm’s market share.201 Moreover, firms may need to 
innovate to avoid losing market share to their innovating competitors. In 
the words of the Chief Executive Officer of Intel Corporation Andrew 
Grove: “Only the paranoid survive.”202 
Although the Schumpeter–Arrow debate has been one of the most 
intensely studied aspects of industrial organization, economists have not 
been able to crown a clear victor.203 Indeed, numerous factors impact the 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 162 , at 8 (positing that under Schumpeter’s 
paradigm, competition left firms with too little to invest in substantial innovation); Baker, supra 
note 194, at 578 (“[F]irms with a strong pre-existing market position, including monopolists, may 
be more willing to pursue R&D if, by virtue of their head start, they have less fear that rivals, 
lacking their installed base and reputation, would be able successfully to market products that 
emulate their new ideas ”); see also Gilbert, supra note 26, at 175 (“The incentive to invest in R&D 
is low if competition post-invention would dissipate all or most of the profits.”). 
 196. Gilbert, supra note 26, at 186. Monopolies may also enjoy advantages in raising capital to 
invest in research and development. Id. 
 197. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 212. 
 198. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 162 , at 8 (“Arrow observed that competitors have 
more to gain from innovating, and much more to lose from failing to do so.”); Baker, supra note 
194, at 578 (stating that Kenneth Arrow provided an alternative theory characterized by the logic 
that “competition rather than monopoly promotes innovation”). 
 199. Baker, supra note 194, at 578.  
 200. Tim Carmody, Why Tim Cook Is the Best Choice to Run Apple, WIRED (Aug. 25, 2011, 
8:41 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/08/why-tim-cook/. 
 201. See Gilbert, supra note 26, at 165 (noting that under Arrow’s paradigm, competitive firms 
can attain a higher differential return if the competitive firm captures the same benefit from 
innovation as the monopolist); id. at 179 (“Monopolies that are protected from innovation 
competition are reluctant to innovate because they merely replace one profit flow with another, 
while new competitors capture the entire benefit of an innovation.”).  
 202. See ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE 3 (1996). 
 203. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 176–77 (“An ‘optimum’ degree of competition, which 
holds across all industries and at all times, for promoting technical progress cannot be established 
by appeal to either theoretical argument or empirical analysis.”); Baker, supra note 194, at 577 
(“While economists widely accept that competition encourages firms to improve product attributes 
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effect of market structure on innovation, including the nature of the 
innovation (product or process) and the extent to which the innovation 
differs from existing technology.204 Empirical analyses have not been able 
to cut through this theoretical morass, as numerous studies on the effects of 
competition on innovation have been largely inconclusive.205 One scholar 
reviewing the literature concluded: “There is little evidence that there is an 
optimal degree of competition to promote [research and development].”206 
One might argue that the indeterminacy of the Schumpeter–Arrow 
debate undermines the assertion that patents that limit competition foster 
productive inefficiency. For firms focusing on the development of new 
products and services, a more productively efficient firm likely will more 
often succeed in innovating. If competition does not promote innovation 
for these firms, however, how can it produce the same results under the 
guise of productive efficiency?  
Such a critique of the effect of competition on productive inefficiency is 
misplaced for two reasons. First, the indeterminacy of the Schumpeter–
Arrow debate does not demonstrate the invalidity of Schumpeter’s 
argument that monopolists capture the benefits of innovation or Arrow’s 
assertion that firms innovate out of fear of losing market share. Rather, the 
debate is unresolved because Schumpeter and Arrow identified 
countervailing concerns and neither uniformly predominates. By 
                                                                                                                     
closely related to price, economists have not been so quick to say that competition encourages 
innovation.”); Gilbert, supra note 26, at 195 (“The economic model of innovation competition does 
not establish a clear favorite model for empirical analysis.”); id. at 161–62. 
 204. See Gilbert, supra note 26, at 165–68, 187. Some of the economic scholarship regarding 
the Schumpeter–Arrow debate unfortunately relies upon unrealistic simplifications regarding patent 
law. For instance, some economists assert that competition undermines innovation because 
innovators are unable to prevent competitors from piggybacking off innovators’ investments in 
developing new technologies. Id. at 164. In actuality, of course, innovators can often prevent such 
freeriding by obtaining patent protection and other intellectual property rights. Conversely, other 
economists contend that monopolies undermine innovation if the “innovator enjoys perfect and 
perpetual exclusive property rights to its invention.” Id. Patent rights, however, are not perpetual 
nor do they “perfectly” eliminate all benefits to competitors from the invention. Brett M. 
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 290–91 (2007); Gilbert, 
supra note 26, at 202. Economists have noted other important considerations omitted from earlier 
economic analyses of the effects of market structure on innovation. For example, monopolies may 
be helpful in developing human capital that later matures in competitive markets. Gilbert, supra 
note 26, at 184. On the other hand, competition may support the pursuit of more diverse research 
projects than is possible under monopoly conditions. Id. at 185. 
 205. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 180–82 (collecting studies); Douglas H. Ginsburg & 
Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 
(2012) (finding that “it is not surprising that the empirical literature attempting to link market 
structure and product market competition . . . to innovation is inconclusive”); see also Gilbert, 
supra note 26, at 187–204 (collecting and analyzing numerous empirical studies). One reason that 
empirical studies have been unable to reach decisive conclusions is that the relationship between 
innovation and market structure runs both ways: one can analyze both whether market structure 
affects innovation and whether innovation affects market structure. See Gilbert, supra note 26, at 
195–96. 
 206. Gilbert, supra note 26, at 206. 
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/5
2014] THE DEBILITATING EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 2081 
 
identifying another benefit to competition, productive inefficiency analysis 
adds new support for Arrow’s position but does not alter the underlying 
nature of the trade-off that lies at the heart of the debate.207 Second, the 
Schumpeter–Arrow debate does not obviate consideration of productive 
inefficiency because the debate focuses only on innovation, and productive 
inefficiencies can arise in parts of firms that are only indirectly related to 
the development of new products and services. For example, even when 
increased competition fails to encourage pharmaceutical companies to 
develop more drugs, it might encourage them to embrace superior 
manufacturing techniques.208 When competition does not increase 
innovation but nonetheless increases productive efficiency, social welfare 
increases.209 Thus, despite the indeterminacy of the Schumpeter–Arrow 
debate, scholars and policy makers should consider the effect of patents on 
productive inefficiency when designing patent regimes. The next 
Subsections explore three unresolved debates in patent law that would 
benefit from such a consideration of productive inefficiency.  
C.  Promoting Commercialization 
Productive inefficiency analysis helps to clarify a long-running, 
contentious debate in patent law regarding the commercialization of 
patented inventions. 
1.  The Commercialization Problem 
Every year, hundreds of thousands of inventions are patented,210 but 
many of them are never commercialized. By one estimate, “[a]bout half, 
probably more, of all patented inventions in the United States are never 
commercially exploited.”211 Without a doubt, “[m]any of these 
undeveloped inventions are commercially worthless,”212 such as U.S. 
Patent No. 6,293,874, which covers a “User-Operated Amusement 
Apparatus for Kicking the User’s Buttocks.”213 However, many 
underdeveloped inventions are likely valuable, and the insufficient 
commercialization of these inventions represents lost opportunities for 
increasing social welfare.214 Standing alone, an invention does not improve 
social welfare unless it ultimately spurs the development of commercial 
products or services.215 Commercialization problems can also arise from 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Indeed, in a situation in which the considerations identified by Schumpeter and Arrow are 
in equipoise, an analysis of productive efficiency may provide a basis for favoring competition. 
 208. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.  
 209. See supra Section II.B. 
 210. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–
2013, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2014). 
 211. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 343–44 (discussing empirical data).  
 212. Id. at 343.   
 213. U.S. Patent No. 6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000). 
 214. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1069 (discussing problems of underdevelopment of 
patented inventions); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 363–64. 
 215. See Sichelman, supra note 51, at 354. 
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delayed commercialication of inventions. Ceteris paribus, obtaining 
benefits earlier is better for society than obtaining those benefits later. 
At least two related factors substantially contribute to the delayed or 
forgone commercialization of patented inventions. First, U.S. patent law 
encourages inventors to patent early in the innovation process, well before 
the inventor has taken many significant steps towards 
commercialization.216 Because patents issue to the first inventor to file a 
patent application, inventors must patent as soon as possible or risk losing 
the patent to another inventor.217 Indeed, multiple independent inventors 
are oftentimes working simultaneously to discover the same invention.218 
Because independent invention is not a defense to patent infringement, the 
second inventor to file a patent application generally will be unable to 
profit from the invention.219 Patent law further encourages inventors to 
patent an invention as soon as possible, because commercialization—either 
by the inventor or a third party—can preclude the inventor from obtaining 
a patent. Specifically, U.S. patent law bars an inventor from obtaining a 
patent if a product incorporating the invention has been sold anywhere in 
the world before the inventor files for a patent.220 Unfortunately, firms that 
are best equipped to invent quickly may not be best suited to 
commercialize, particularly when successful commercialization requires 
sales on a large scale to be profitable.221 An inventing firm might license or 
assign their inventions to firms better equipped to commercialize them, but 
                                                                                                                     
 216. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 
72 (2009); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (pressuring early patent filings); Sichelman, supra note 
51, at 350–51 (“[B]ecause of the reward theory’s preference for early patenting and the weak 
disclosure standards applied by the Patent Office, patents are granted at the initial stages of 
conception, which . . . can lead to the significant underdevelopment of inventions.”(footnote 
omitted)). 
 217. Recently, the United States shifted from a system that awarded patent rights only to the 
first person to discover an invention to a system that awards patent rights only to the first inventor 
to file a patent application. William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 367 
(2013). 
 218. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712 (2012) 
(“The overwhelming majority of inventions, including the overwhelming majority of so-called 
‘pioneering’ inventions, are in fact developed by individuals or groups working independently at 
roughly the same time.”). 
 219. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text; Gregory N. Mandel, The Public 
Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261 (2014) (“[P]atent law prohibits a later 
independent inventor from obtaining patent protection on the same subject matter as an earlier 
inventor.”). An inventor who fails to patent but commercializes her invention may be able to 
continue to practice the invention if she qualifies as a prior user under 35 U.S.C. § 273. 
 220. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). In some cases, the inventor may be able to obtain a one-year 
grace period for this bar. Id. § 102(b). 
 221. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 205–06 (hypothesizing an efficient procedure to 
mitigate the “early stage innovative disabilities of large size”); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 367 
(“[T]here is no reason to expect that inventors who win the race to patent will be the best 
commercializers.”). 
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productive inefficiencies and transaction costs may prevent inventors from 
executing the transfer of rights.222 Indeed, highly innovative firms 
sometimes refuse to sell or license their patents until they are facing 
bankruptcy.223 
The second factor that contributes to the underdevelopment of patented 
inventions is that the steps towards commercialization that follow early 
patenting are uncertain and expensive.224 For instance, to commercialize an 
invention an inventor often must develop a prototype, a manufacturing 
process, and distribution channels. Innovators also frequently perform 
market experimentation, including “studies to assess the effectiveness of 
the invention, testing commercially the public’s demand for the invention, 
and informing customers or others about the invention,”225 and the cost of 
this testing can be significant.226 Indeed, by some estimates the cost of 
commercializing a patented invention substantially exceeds prepatented 
invention expenses.227 Unfortunately, even an inventor who is willing to 
invest in commercialization may fail to produce a commercially successful 
product or service because there is a particularly high probability of failure 
in developing innovative products.228 Facing these challenges, many patent 
owners do not even attempt to commercialize their inventions, and opt 
instead to profit from their patents through litigation.229 
                                                                                                                     
 222. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 223. For example, Kodak did not sell its portfolio of patents until after it declared bankruptcy 
in early 2012. John Brodkin, Kodak Declares Bankruptcy, Presses on with Patent Suits, Digital 
Strategy, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2012/01/kodak-
declares-bankruptcy-presses-on-with-patent-suits-digital-strategy/; Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell Digital 
Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525-million.html. Similarly, 
Nortel Networks declared bankruptcy in 2009, and subsequently sold its portfolio for $4.5 
billion. Steven Church et al., Apple Joins Microsoft, RIM in $4.5 Billion Buy of Nortel 
Patents, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-
01/nortel-sellspatent-portfolio-for-4-5-billion-to-group.html. See generally CLAYTON M. 
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (1997) (analyzing the factors that lead technologically 
successful firms to fail). 
 224. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 192 (providing that at the early stages of innovative 
development, modest resources are frequently sufficient, however “later stage development often 
incurs much greater expense”). 
 225. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1099.  
 226. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 65, at 339–40; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 351(“Often 
the capital required for the market testing and product commercialization phase is tremendous.”). 
 227. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 371–72 (“[P]ost-invention development and 
commercialization expenses dwarf pre-invention expenses in nearly all industries.”). 
 228. Id. at 361 & n.116 (collecting numerous supporting authorities); see also Abramowicz, 
supra note 43, at 1101 (“The problem of inventors’ not engaging in sufficient commercial 
experimentation is particularly severe for inventions that have a small probability of large 
commercial success and a great probability of failure. Once an invention falls into the public 
domain, someone considering commercializing the invention faces the prospect of bearing the entire 
cost of the experimentation if it fails.”). 
 229. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1073 (noting that patent owners may forego exercising 
their “development option” in favor of their “litigation option”). 
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2.  Existing Proposals 
Although many scholars have recognized the importance of 
commercializing patented inventions, these scholars differ sharply in their 
proposals for increasing commercialization. Importantly, they also disagree 
on the extent to which exclusive rights that limit competition will 
encourage commercialization.  
One group of scholars asserts that strong patent rights best promote the 
commercialization of inventions. The most influential of these analyses is 
Edmond Kitch’s “prospect theory” of patent law.230 Noting that the 
traditional justification of patent law posits that a patent “enables an 
inventor to capture the returns from his investment in the invention,” Kitch 
argued that this “reward theory [of patent law] offers an incomplete view 
of the functions of the patent system” because it fails to recognize the 
effect of patent rights on postinvention commercialization efforts.231 In 
explaining these effects, Kitch famously analogized patents to mineral 
prospects.232 Kitch noted that awarding exclusive rights to extract minerals 
in a location encourages individuals to invest thereafter the significant 
capital required for successful mining operations.233 Kitch asserted that 
patents similarly promote the subsequent commercialization of inventions 
by awarding to patentees the exclusive “opportunity to develop a known 
technological possibility . . . . shortly after its discovery.”234 Kitch noted 
that without patent protection, an innovator might be reluctant to invest in 
commercial development because the fruits of that labor may “produce 
unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”235 Kitch therefore 
concluded that the prospect function of patents justifies awarding patents 
well before commercial exploitation is feasible.236 Moreover, Kitch 
asserted that the prospect function of patents is a “significant, if not the 
predominant, function of the American patent system as it has operated in 
fact.”237  
                                                                                                                     
 230. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977) (“[T]he view of the patent system offered here conceives of the process of 
technological innovation as one in which resources are brought to bear upon an arrary of prospects, 
each with its own associated sets of probabilities of costs and returns.”). But see Abramowicz, supra 
note 43, at 1070 (“[O]ur patent system is actually not much of a prospect system.”). 
 231. Kitch, supra note 230, at 266. 
 232. Id. (arguing that the mineral claim industry serves as a close analog to the patent 
industry).   
 233. Id. at 274.  
 234. Id. at 266. 
 235. Id. at 276; accord Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1101 (noting that if a patent succeeds, 
the original patent holder will likely have to fend off third parties seeking to enter the market and 
claim some portion of the market share that the original holder enjoyed). 
 236. Kitch, supra note 230, at 267. 
 237. Id. For example, application of patent law to the pharmaceutical industry exhibits 
prominent prospect theory features. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1095; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante 
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Some more recent scholars have embraced Kitch’s argument that 
exclusive rights promote commercialization,238 while tempering prospect 
theory with a measure of additional competition. For example, Michael 
Abramowicz recommends extending the duration of some patents to 
encourage commercialization.239 Abramowicz recognizes, however, that 
patent term extensions could generate additional costs, most notably a 
deadweight loss from allocative inefficiency: “If a patent term is too short, 
the patentee might have socially insufficient incentives to develop the 
patent by engaging in nonpatentable research and commercialization 
activities, but if it is too long, excessive deadweight loss will result.”240 To 
balance these considerations, Abramowicz recommends limiting patent 
term extensions to those likely to foster commercialization. Under 
Abramowicz’s proposal, extensions should be offered at the end of a 
patent’s normal term “when the additional development activities an 
extended term would enable and the costs of extended protection should be 
clear.”241 Moreover, to reduce the deadweight loss from allocative 
inefficiency, Abramowicz proposes apportioning patent term extensions 
through auctions.242 Abramowicz contends that such auctions with multiple 
bidders would provide sufficient competitive elements to ensure that the 
social benefits of the proposed patent term extensions would exceed the 
deadweight losses from allocative inefficiencies.243  
Other scholars likewise assert that hybrid solutions can best promote 
the commercialization of patented inventions but advocate for even 
stronger competitive dimensions.244 Ted Sichelman recommends that U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141 (2004). In part 
due to the requirements of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, commercializing a 
pharmaceutical invention is enormously expensive. Drug companies would be reluctant to invest in 
such commercialization without the protection of exclusive patent rights. 
 238. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (arguing that strong exclusive rights are “necessary to 
facilitate investment in the complex, costly, and risky commercialization activities required to turn 
nascent inventions into new goods and services”). 
 239. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1098.  
 240. Id. at 1106. Indeed, because inventors often race to obtain patent rights, an inventor will 
often patent long before commercialization is possible, which will “result in shorter effective patent 
terms.” Id. 
 241. Id. at 1108. 
 242. See id. at 1108–20. 
 243. See id. at 1109 (arguing that competition between bidders in auctions will increase 
incentives to invest in future inventions and that the small windfalls represented by term extensions 
would be “part of the incentive to create”). 
 244. For example, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that prospect theory should be 
applied selectively to certain industries, with patenting in the early stages of technical development 
most appropriate for pharmaceutical inventions. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1616 (2003) (“The prospect vision of patents maps most closely 
onto invention in the pharmaceutical industry.”). Burk and Lemley caution, however, against early 
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patent law be amended to create a new form of intellectual property right, 
which he terms a “commercialization patent.”245 Importantly, “a 
commercialization patent not only would provide a negative right to 
exclude others from making and selling the same or equivalent products, 
but also would include an affirmative equitable and legal right to its holder 
to make and sell the product.”246 In an infringement suit against the owner 
of a commercialization patent, the owner of a traditional invention patent 
would be able to obtain only “a low, but fairly reasonable, fixed royalty 
rate.”247 While maintaining some exclusivity for the owner of the 
traditional patent, commercialization patents would thus foster substantial 
competition between the owner of the traditional patent and the recipient of 
a commercialization patent.248 Moreover, because a commercialization 
patent would grant narrow protection restricted to the product described in 
the particular grant, other innovators could obtain their own 
commercialization patents to develop different products from the 
underlying invention.249 Sichelman asserts that the expanded competition 
made possible by commercialization patents would reduce the deadweight 
loss from allocative inefficiency caused by traditional patent rights.250  
Other approaches to commercialization go further than Sichelman’s 
approach in promoting competition. For example, some scholars advocate 
for strengthening patenting requirements, so that patents would become 
available at a time less removed from commercialization, thereby moving 
the “inventor further down the development path before examination,” 
while concomitantly giving “the inventor a clearer picture of the possible 
commercial value of the invention” before obtaining a patent.251 Other 
scholars propose strengthening the experimental-use defense to patent 
infringement to allow competitors to begin the lengthy process of 
commercializing a patented invention during the term of the patent, so that 
robust commercial competition could commence immediately upon the 
                                                                                                                     
patenting for isolated segments of human DNA due to concerns that overlapping patent claims 
would discourage further innovation. Id. at 1624–27. 
 245. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 345–46. 
 246. Id. at 346 (emphasis omitted). In contrast, traditional patent rights provide only the 
negative rights to prevent infringers from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into 
the United States a patented invention. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 247. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 346. 
 248. To ensure that inventors retain sufficient incentives to invent, Sichelman recommends 
“giv[ing] the invention patent holder a head start to commercialize its invention, for example, three 
years after issuance, extended for regulatory and Patent Office delays during the commercialization 
process.” Id. at 406. 
 249. See id. at 401 (arguing that commercialization patents “should be limited exactly to the 
product described in the specification” because the justification for such patents is to “encourage 
the development of specific products not currently in the marketplace” (emphasis omitted)). 
 250. Id. at 408. 
 251. E.g., Cotropia, supra note 216, at 119–20. 
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patent’s expiration.252 Some foreign patent laws go even further by 
entitling innovators to compulsory licenses to uncommercialized patents.253  
3.  Incorporating Productive Inefficiency Analysis 
For decades, accomplished and insightful scholars have debated—with 
no clear victor—the best approach to fostering the commercialization of 
patented inventions. The reason for the lack of resolution is that a difficult 
balancing of costs and benefits lies at the heart of the debate and 
competition potentially impacts both sides of this balancing. In analyzing 
this trade-off, scholars have relied on traditional neoclassical economics. 
For example, prospect theorists assume that inventors are profit 
maximizers and argue that freeriding by competitors can prevent inventors 
from pursuing profitable commercialization opportunities.254 Other 
scholars argue that the same reduction in competition that protects 
incentives to commercialize will create deadweight losses through 
allocative inefficiencies.  
While insightfully juggling neoclassical economic concerns, these 
scholars have omitted from their analyses considerations of productive 
inefficiency. For example, although Kitch notes that “many important 
inventions are patented early in their development,” he fails to consider 
whether the early patenting of the invention might have delayed 
commercialization.255 Similarly, while Abramowicz recognizes the 
importance of competition in the structure of his auctions for patent term 
extensions, he fails to consider whether competition is also needed during 
the commercialization phase to reduce productive inefficiency. Even 
scholars who generally embrace competition have not realized the full 
scope of the benefits stemming from competition. For instance, in arguing 
for some exclusive rights to commercialize, Sichelman asserts that strong 
                                                                                                                     
 252. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1953–57 (discussing the experimental use defense). 
 253. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1107; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 394; see also Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 
(revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) (describing compulsory patent licenses). Such laws are rarely 
invoked. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 395; see, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India Orders 
Bayer to License a Patented Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/ 
13/business/global/india-overrules-bayer-allowing-generic-drug.html (reporting that the government 
of India granted a compulsory license for a patented cancer drug because the price charged by the 
patent owner was “unaffordable to most of the nation”). 
 254. See Kitch, supra note 230, at 276 (“[T]he patent owner has an incentive to make 
investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will 
produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”). Some information related to 
commercialization can be protected by improvement patents or other forms of intellectual property, 
like trade secrets or copyrights. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1091. Likewise, first mover 
effects can prevent competitors from successfully profiting from another firm’s commercialization 
efforts. Id. Many of the fruits of efforts to commercialize, however, are not protectable by these 
mechanisms. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 373. 
 255. See Kitch, supra note 230, at 271. 
43
Hubbard: The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Producti
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
2088 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
patent rights often will fail to promote commercialization because 
inventors may not be effective commercializers and because transaction 
costs may prevent inventors from transferring their rights to superior 
commercializers.256 Patent-related productive inefficiencies may make 
matters worse by undermining inventors’ effectiveness in both 
commercialization and licensing.257 
In fact, productive inefficiencies are likely to arise during the 
commercialization of a patented invention, particularly if exclusive rights 
insulate a commercializing firm from competition. Employees involved in 
commercialization may be reluctant to develop new products or services, in 
part because it takes effort “to convert knowledge from a feeling or an idea 
into a form that is useful for the firm.”258 Conserving effort and favoring 
old habits, employees may be slow to pursue opportunities to 
commercialize inventions. Moreover, employees may be disinclined to 
attempt to commercialize an invention due to loss aversion, status quo 
bias, and hyperbolic discounting because the chance of failure is often high 
and the costs of a failed commercialization effort are typically easier to 
measure than the forgone benefits of a new product that is never 
developed.259 Management can easily quantify the time and money 
invested in the development of a new product and compare those expenses 
to the profits of a new product. In contrast, when an employee delays 
working to commercialize a new invention, management frequently will be 
unable to quantify the impact on the firm’s profits because of the 
substantial uncertainty regarding the cost of commercialization, the 
likelihood of success, and the amount of profits a new product would 
generate if successful.260 Employees with responsibilities related to new 
product development therefore may not optimally exert themselves, 
particularly when existing products continue to provide alternate 
opportunities.261 Instead, employees tasked with commercializing an 
invention may wait until other technological or commercial developments 
reduce the risk of commercializing the invention.262 Even employees 
working on tasks tangentially related to new product development, like 
                                                                                                                     
 256. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 368–70. 
 257. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 4, 34 (arguing that cognitive biases will 
hamper patnet licensing); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 701 (noting the downstream effects 
of cognitive biases on commercialization). 
 258. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 97. 
 259. See supra notes 83–86, 159 and accompanying text.  
 260. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1075; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 361. 
 261. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 266 (“[W]hen someone can sell at high prices 
because of legal protection from imitators, he or she will not expend much effort looking for better 
or cheaper ways to do things.”). 
 262. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1075–78 (describing the benefits of waiting to 
commercialize an invention). 
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marketing, may exhibit high levels of productive inefficiency due to the 
comparative ease of quantifying failed commercialization efforts.263 
Scholars and policy makers thus should consider the impact of 
productive inefficiency in crafting laws that foster the commercialization 
of patented inventions. Considerations of productive inefficiency will not 
change the nature of the trade-off that underlies commercialization policy, 
but productive inefficiency analysis provides additional support for 
arguments in favor of greater competition, like Sichelman’s, because 
competition reduces productive inefficiency. Even if die-hard prospect 
theorists are correct that competition reduces some incentives to 
commercialize, competition can increase the responsiveness of firms to 
incentives, so that smaller incentives to commercialize paradoxically may 
produce greater effect.264  
D.  Patent Scope  
Productive-inefficiency analysis also provides new insights into an 
unresolved debate regarding the appropriate scope of patent protection. 
The scope of a patent largely depends on a patent’s “claims,” which are 
numbered sentences at the end of the patent (and the patent application 
before the patent issues) that “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] 
the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the 
invention.”265 Inventors often strive to obtain patents with expansive 
claims because broader exclusive rights are more valuable to the inventor. 
Broad patent claims are more likely to be infringed by competitors, and 
therefore may allow the patentee to enjoy higher profits during the term of 
the patent. However, patent law prevents inventors from obtaining 
exclusive rights that exceed the scope of the inventors’ discoveries. For 
example, an inventor must describe the invention in sufficiently clear, 
concise, and exact terms so as to enable any person skilled in the 
technological field to which the patent pertains to practice it, and patent 
claims cannot exceed the scope of enablement.266 Nevertheless, numerous 
other doctrines allow inventors to obtain patent protection that exceeds the 
scopes of their inventive efforts.267 Moreover, patent examiners and courts 
                                                                                                                     
 263. Furthermore, the uncertainty related to potential commercialization limits the capacity of 
management to reduce employees’ productive inefficiencies. See supra Subsection III.C.2.  
 264. See Gerla, supra note 17, at 236 (“To the extent that rivalry curbs [productive 
inefficiencies] in firms, it can serve to facilitate the creation and commercial exploitation of 
innovations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 265. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 266. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Such disclosure is often described as “the quid pro quo of the right to 
exclude.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). 
 267. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 350. For example, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and 
courts assess only whether a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technological field could 
practice the invention “without undue experimentation,” thereby granting patent examiners and 
courts substantial discretion in assessing whether the inventor has satisfied the enablement 
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are systematically biased in favor of supporting inventors’ efforts to obtain 
broad patent protection.  The U.S. Patent Office requires patent examiners 
to grant patent applications unless an examiner can demonstrate that a 
patent should not issue. Similarly, courts hold patents valid unless a 
challenger proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.268 
Scholars disagree regarding the effect of awarding patents of such broad 
scope. Some scholars consider broad patents to be problematic because 
they raise the cost of developing improvements to existing, patented 
technology.269 Prospect theorists disagree, arguing that awarding inventors 
broad patent rights promotes innovation: “This puts the patent owner in a 
position to coordinate the search for technological and market 
enhancement of the patent’s value so that duplicative investments are not 
made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.”270 
Productive-inefficiency analysis cautions against awarding patents with 
scopes substantially exceeding their disclosures. Insulated from 
competition, the owner of such a broad patent may ineffectively develop 
the patent’s full scope. Even if a broad patent discourages duplicative 
research efforts, the patent owner’s efforts may suffer from substantial 
productive inefficiencies regarding the development of goods and services 
that fall within the scope of the patentee’s exclusive rights but outside of 
the patent’s disclosure. In many cases, inventors are likely to focus their 
subsequent research and commercialization efforts on the aspects of the 
invention disclosed in the patent description and not on uses of the 
invention that are far removed from the inventor’s prepatenting 
activities.271 Reducing the wasted costs from duplicative efforts is not per 
se more important than improving the quality of those efforts. Indeed, as an 
                                                                                                                     
requirement. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Also, the level of scrutiny applied to a patent application appears to depend substantially 
upon which patent examiner is working on the patent. See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking 
Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 155, 170 (2004) (noting that patent 
examiners “differ sharply in terms of their tendency to instigate claim language alterations”). 
Another doctrine that allows inventors to obtain patents that substantially exceed the scope of the 
disclosed invention is the doctrine of equivalents, which extends patent protection to “equivalent” 
technologies that fall outside of the literal scope of the patent claims. William R. Hubbard, Efficient 
Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 347–48 (2009). A patent applicant also may strategically 
draft an unclear claim that “enables the examiner to adopt a narrow, valid construction while also 
allowing the patentee to argue a broad, but invalid, construction in a later patent infringement 
dispute.” Id. at 346. 
 268. See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). Moreover, patents are statutorily presumed to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Sean B. 
Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995 (2013).  
 269. See Kitch, supra note 230, at 268 n.9; Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 870. 
 270. Kitch, supra note 230, at 276. 
 271. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 873 (arguing that inventors have the tendency to 
focus on past experience). 
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empirical matter, firms often fail to develop improvements to patented 
technology until threatened by outside competition.272  
This concern is particularly salient regarding patents on chemical 
compounds. To obtain a patent for a new chemical compound, an inventor 
must show both that the compound is new and that the compound is 
“useful.”273 Patents cannot issue for new compounds if the patentee is 
merely studying the compound with the goal of discovering a use.274 The 
typical justification for this rule is that allowing a patent on a compound 
before identifying a use for the compound would prevent others from 
researching the uses of the compound. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 
Brenner v. Manson, until a new compound is “shown to be useful, the 
metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. 
It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.”275 Once an 
inventor discovers a use for the compound, however, the patent applies to 
all uses of the compound, even those uses that are unrelated to the use 
identified by the patentee in satisfying the utility requirement.276 Consistent 
with prospect theory, a patent on a new compound with many uses thus 
may provide an inventor with exclusive rights to uses of the compound that 
the inventor has not disclosed or discovered. 
Productive inefficiency analysis identifies a problem with awarding 
broad patents on chemical compounds that extend to undiscovered uses. 
Although a patentee might investigate alternate uses of a compound (or 
license others to do so), such activities are less likely because the patent 
protects the patentee from competition regarding those alternate uses and 
thus exacerbates productive inefficiencies. Indeed, patent owners are more 
likely to focus on uses related to those already identified in the patent. For 
compounds with few alternate uses, patents covering undisclosed uses 
likely will not significantly affect productive inefficiency. But many 
compounds have substantial alternate uses, and the harm to society from 
the delayed innovation regarding such uses may be substantial.277 For these 
compounds, tailoring the patentee’s exclusive rights more closely to the 
uses actually disclosed in the patent may maximize social welfare.278 
                                                                                                                     
 272. Id. at 872. 
 273. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 274. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (declining to award 
patent protection for “research intermediates”). 
 275. 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 276. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 ( 2012). 
 277. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 233 (noting that “[m]onopolies innovate as little as 
possible and only when forced to . . . .”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 852; see, e.g., 
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (reviewing a patent on a new 
use for a known product and noting that “[d]evelopment of new uses for existing chemicals is thus a 
major component of practical chemical research”). 
 278. U.S. patent law “permits parties to obtain [new] patents on new uses for existing 
inventions.” Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1100. 
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One example of a chemical compound that may have many alternate 
uses is a form of synthetic human DNA known as cDNA.279 Recently, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the patentability of cDNA in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.280 The defendant in the case, 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., discovered that mutations of two human genes, 
labeled BRCA1 and BRCA2, substantially increase the chance of breast 
and ovarian cancer.281 Myriad Genetics obtained patents on the genes both 
as isolated fragments of naturally occurring human DNA and as synthetic 
cDNA sequences.282 In reviewing the validity of these patents, the Supreme 
Court concluded that patent protection was not available for the genes as 
isolated segments of naturally occurring DNA, but readily affirmed the 
patentability of the cDNA segments.283 Importantly, although Myriad 
obtained patents covering all uses of the cDNA versions of BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, Myriad disclosed only certain uses for those synthetic genes, such 
as diagnosing whether a patient faces an increased risk of breast and 
ovarian cancer by determining if the patient’s DNA includes the mutated 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes.284 As a result, Myriad’s patents would cover—
but importantly not disclose—any later discovered uses for the synthetic 
genes, such as treatments for remedying the identified genetic mutations or 
related cancers.285 Although Myriad might profit from developing such 
new uses, productive inefficiencies within Myriad—if unchecked by 
competition—could slow the progress of the research necessary to discover 
those treatments. Moreover, Myriad’s patents may implicate medical 
conditions unrelated to breast and ovarian cancer because mutations in one 
gene may cause many different types of cancer286 and because  genes often 
                                                                                                                     
 279. See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for 
Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2013) (discussing cDNA generally); see also 
Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1097 (noting that prospect theory might have problematic effects 
when applied to DNA patents). 
 280. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).  
 281. Id. at 2112.  
 282. Id. at 2113; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995) (assigning a human 
genetics patent to, inter alios, Myriad Genetics); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995) 
(same); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed Jan. 20, 1998) (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed 
June 7, 1995) (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (same); U.S. Patent No. 
5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996) (same); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed Mar. 20, 2000) (same). 
 283. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 (“cDNA does not present the same 
obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments.”). 
 284. Id. at 2112–13. 
 285. Since losing their battle in the Supreme Court, Myriad has returned to asserting its patents 
against competitors that test for mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Joe Mullin, Myriad, 
Fresh off Supreme Court Loss, Keeps on Suing over Gene Patents, ARS TECHNICA (July 11, 2013, 
8:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/myriad-fresh-off-supreme-court-loss-keeps-
on-suing-over-gene-patents/. 
 286. Ohio State Univ. Div. of Nephrology, Study Shows That Mutations In One Gene Cause 
Many Cancers, OHIO ST. UNIV., http://internalmedicine.osu.edu/nephrology/article.cfm?ID=5511 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2014). Indeed, Myriad’s patents explicitly state that mutations in the BRCA1 
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overlap one another.287 Once again, Myriad might profit from exploring the 
relationships among BRCA1, BRCA2, and other types of cancer. Without 
sufficient competition, though, productive inefficiencies could prompt 
Myriad to focus only on areas of existing expertise, such as breast and 
ovarian cancer. 
One promising approach to limiting the productive inefficiencies from 
patents on multiuse compounds is to establish a robust experimental-use 
defense to promote competition regarding the discovery of alternate uses. 
Today, U.S. patent law usually prevents competitors from experimenting 
on patented technology. Although there is a general experimental-use 
defense, current U.S. patent law limits it to experimentation “for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry.”288 For example, an experiment “in furtherance of the alleged 
infringer’s legitimate business” typically does not qualify for the 
defense.289 As a result, patent law often limits competition—thereby 
fostering productive inefficiency—regarding the development of 
alternative uses for patented compounds. Although the experimental-use 
defense is narrow in most areas of technology, U.S. patent law contains a 
stronger statutory experimental-use defense in areas of technology 
“reasonably related” to the manufacture, use, and sale of drugs.290 For these 
technologies, patent law insulates much research regarding alternate uses 
of drugs from claims of patent infringement, thereby limiting, to some 
extent, the productive inefficiencies stemming from patents on drug-related 
compounds.291 For example, although patents on cDNA could contribute to 
substantial productive inefficiencies for the reasons noted above, the 
existing experimental-use defense may mitigate this problem. 
Nevertheless, the statutory defense for experimentation reasonably related 
to drugs does not fully address productive-inefficiency concerns because 
the defense does not apply to basic scientific research regarding patented 
compounds.292 Moreover, outside of these areas of technology the 
experimental-use defense is extremely narrow. 
                                                                                                                     
and BRCA2 genes relate to breast cancer, ovarian cancer, colorectal cancer, and prostate cancer and 
“may be involved in the initiation and/or progression of other types of tumors.” U.S. Patent No. 
5,693,473 col. 19 ln. 27–29 (filed June 7, 1995). 
 287. Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing Ethical and 
Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 119, 153 (2009) (“And 
while biologists have often assumed that genes are compact, the new research indicates that genes 
can be sprawling, with far-flung protein-coding and regulatory regions that overlap with other 
genes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 288. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 289. Id.  
 290. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines “drug” 
to include any “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease in man.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
 291. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005). 
 292. Id. at 205–06. 
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Therefore, a stronger defense to patent infringement for 
experimentation related to the development of alternate uses for chemical 
compounds may help to reduce productive inefficiencies. Such a defense 
could be tailored to preserve the patentee’s incentives to discover and 
disclose a new compound. For example, to qualify for the experimental use 
defense, patent law could require a competitor to demonstrate that its 
research targets a use that is substantially different from any uses for the 
compound identified in the patent, utilized by the patentee, or found in the 
prior art. Furthermore, the defense could apply only to experimentation by 
a competitor and not to the commercial use of the fruits of such 
experimentation. Accordingly, to commercialize the alternative use a 
competitor would need to license the patent from the patent owner. To 
facilitate such licensing, the competitor could seek a patent on the method 
of using the compound for the newly discovered use.293 Such an expanded 
but focused experimental use defense would facilitate the development of 
alternate uses for patented compounds by reducing productive 
inefficiencies while maintaining robust incentives to patent and disclose 
new compounds.  
E.  Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office 
Considerations of productive inefficiency also shed new light on an 
unresolved debate regarding the examination of patent applications by the 
U.S. Patent Office. The U.S. Patent Office accepts more than half of a 
million applications for patents every year.294 Unfortunately, the 
examination of these applications is, in the eyes of many observers, an 
ineffective process.295 Though the U.S. Patent Office strives to issue only 
clear, valid patents, mistakes are common, in part because budgetary 
constraints force patent examiners to spend very little time reviewing each 
patent application.296 By one estimate, patent examiners spend on average 
only eighteen hours reviewing a typical patent application.297 As a result, 
                                                                                                                     
 293. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1100 ( “[T]he current [U.S.] patent system permits parties 
to obtain [new] patents on new uses for existing inventions.”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 
860.  
 294. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 210. 
 295. Patent examination is also a slow process. Today, patent applications languish for about 
eighteen months before receiving an initial review by an examiner, and the entire examination 
process typically lasts almost thirty months. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DATA 
VISUALIZATION CENTER, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Aug. 
11, 2014). 
 296. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 45, 61 (2007); see Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 675, 679 (2009) (arguing that examiners make mistakes given the time constraints 
they face). A U.S. patent can be invalid for many reasons. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2012). 
 297. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent 
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 135 (2002).  
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approximately half of the patents whose validity is tested through litigation 
are ultimately declared invalid.298 Moreover, the scopes of patents issued 
by the U.S. Patent Office are notoriously unclear.299 
Unfortunately, these shortcomings in patent examination significantly 
reduce social welfare. For example, an invalid patent can raise costs for 
consumers and competitors without providing the offsetting benefit of a 
new invention.300 Similarly, when the scope of a patent is unclear, it may 
be difficult to determine if a patent is infringed or invalid.301 Facing invalid 
or unclear patents, some firms may license unnecessarily or eschew some 
socially beneficial commercial activity altogether.302 Although competitors 
can challenge invalid and unclear patents in court, the cost of doing so is 
often high.303  
Patent scholars generally agree that invalid and unclear patents reduce 
social welfare, however, there is little consensus regarding the best 
approaches for improving patent examination. Some scholars assert that 
the U.S. Patent Office should require inventors to provide more 
information to the examiners to facilitate the review of their patent 
applications.304 Other scholars reject this approach, arguing that increasing 
the burdens on patent applicants is not cost justified because very few 
patents warrant such expenditures.305 For example, by one estimate only 
5% of patents produce any revenue.306 Investing additional resources in the 
examination of all patent applications would not be “rational” since such 
additional examination efforts could not produce any benefits in the vast 
majority of cases.307 
                                                                                                                     
 298. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).  
 299. Surden, supra note 54, at 1747. 
 300. Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1227 (listing the private and social costs resulting from 
invalid patents); see also supra Section II.B. 
 301. See Surden, supra note 54, at 1752–55 (discussing costs stemming from patents with 
unclear scope). 
 302. Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1227; Surden, supra note 54, at 1752–55. 
 303. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1229 (noting high litigation costs as a subset of 
high transaction costs). 
 304. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 203–05 (2005) (proposing that because inventors can 
easily provide supplemental information at a very small added cost, inventors should include a 
glossary of terms in their patent applications); Surden, supra note 54, at 1809–10. At the urging of 
the Obama Administration, the U.S. Patent Office has recently begun exploring the use of glossaries 
to increase patent clarity. See Glossary Initiative, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/glossary_initiative.jsp (last visited Aug. 11, 2014). 
 305. See Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507. 
 306. Id.; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 100 (“[T]he majority of patents are not 
worth more than a few thousand dollars.”).  
 307. See Hubbard, supra note 267, at 359–60; Lemley, supra note 60, at 1497; Miller, supra 
note 304, at 196. 
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The debate regarding the efficacy of the U.S. Patent Office is framed 
only in terms of neoclassical economics. Some scholars contend that the 
traditional benefits of investing additional resources in patent examination 
exceed the traditional costs, while other scholars dispute this calculation. 
All of these scholars, however, implicitly assume that additional 
investments are the only mechanism for increasing the productivity of 
“rational” patent examiners.308 Productive inefficiency analysis rejects this 
assumption and recognizes that market conditions can affect the 
productivity of individuals and organizations. In fact, it is highly likely that 
the Patent Office suffers from substantial productive inefficiencies because 
it faces virtually no competition. The U.S. Patent Office is the only entity 
that can issue patents that provide exclusive rights to make, use, or sell an 
invention throughout the United States, which is the largest market in the 
world.309 With this monopoly, the U.S. Patent Office evades the 
disciplining effects of competition.310 
Productive inefficiency analysis thus suggests potential mechanisms for 
improving processes at the Patent Office. In the absence of competition, 
the Patent Office should use managerial oversight to increase the 
productive efficiency of patent examiners. Admittedly, this has been the 
traditional approach to improving examiner output at the Patent Office, and 
as described above, management faces many challenges in doing so. For 
example, it is difficult for management to know how many patent 
applications a focused and diligent examiner could process in a given time 
period.311 
Recent changes to U.S. patent law may help to fill this information 
void. Specifically, in 2010, the U.S. Patent Office opened a satellite branch 
in Detroit, Michigan.312 Similarly, in passing the Leahy–Smith America 
Invents Act in the fall of 2011, Congress required the Patent Office to 
“establish 3 or more satellite offices in the United States to carry out the 
responsibilities of the Office.”313 Pursuant to this mandate, the Patent 
Office announced in July 2012 plans to open regional U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Offices near Dallas, Denver, and Silicon Valley.314  
                                                                                                                     
 308. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1248–50 (critiquing other scholars for failing to 
recognize the effects of bounded rationality on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). 
 309. Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1935–38 (characterizing the United States as “the largest 
consumer market in the world”). 
 310. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 136. 
 311. See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text. 
 312. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Opens First-Ever Satellite Office in Detroit, Michigan, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 13, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-41.jsp.  
 313. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 23, 125 Stat. 284, 336–37 
(2011). 
 314. U.S. Commerce Department to Open Four Regional U.S. Patent Offices That Will Speed 
Up the Patent Process and Help American Businesses Innovate, Grow, and Create Jobs, U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 2, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-40.jsp. 
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Although the details of these offices are still coalescing, the Patent 
Office and Congress could create conditions that emulate competition 
among the offices in at least three respects.315 First, allowing each office to 
hire its own examiners would allow the offices to compete with each other 
for talented personnel. Second, Congress could tie the funding for each 
office to the office’s performance in some respects. For example, if 
inventors are able to choose freely which office will review their 
applications, Congress could use the number of applications to an office to 
determine funding for each office. If the Dallas office were to reduce 
examination delays or develop a reputation for issuing patents that were 
less likely to be invalid, more inventors might file applications with that 
office, thereby increasing the funding for the Dallas office. Some of that 
largess might be passed on to the examiners either in the form of higher 
salaries or perks, thereby encouraging the examiners to increase their 
productivity. Because inventors might gravitate towards an office that 
applies lower standards of patentability, Congress might also reduce 
funding based on the frequency of patents from each office being held 
invalid in litigation. Third, if the U.S. Patent Office were to collect and 
disseminate information regarding the productivity of each office, 
comparisons between the different offices may help managers in some 
offices to reduce examiner productive inefficiencies. For instance, if 
examiners in the Dallas office work more expeditiously than examiners in 
the Detroit office, managers in the Detroit office might apply greater 
pressure on their examiners to improve their productivity. Similarly, one 
office could learn of successful work flow mechanisms by hiring 
examiners away from a “competitor” satellite office. 
CONCLUSION 
The effects of patent law on society are undoubtedly complex. Patents 
can benefit society by stimulating socially beneficial invention. 
Nevertheless, patents also limit competition and thus can deny society the 
benefits that robust competition produces. In seeking to understand this 
trade-off, lawmakers and scholars have relied upon traditional—but 
simplified—economics, including the foundational assumption that firms 
always maximize their profits.  
Modern economic scholarship acknowledges that, in reality, individuals 
and firms often do not maximize their profits due to productive 
inefficiencies. For instance, cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and bad 
habits cause individuals to fail to maximize their own welfare. Moreover, 
employees often opportunistically pursue personal objectives that 
undermine firm profits. Rather than assiduously working to maximize firm 
                                                                                                                     
 315. See Posner, supra note 5, at 574 (noting that even multiple local monopolies in different 
regions can provide “sufficient diversity to produce many useful examples for emulation by the 
others”). 
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profits, employees may seek on-the-job leisure, personal relationships, 
perquisites, and status. When patents or other forces restrict competition, 
productive inefficiencies can take root.  
Unfortunately, legal scholars and policy makers have overlooked 
productive inefficiencies and have ignored a substantial cost associated 
with patent protection. The critique that economist A.T. Hadley made of 
economics more than a century ago applies with equal force to patent 
scholarship today: “We have been so accustomed to think of competition 
as a regulator of prices that we have lost sight of its equally important 
function as a stimulus to efficiency.”316 To better calibrate patent law for 
social benefit, lawmakers should consider all of the costs and benefits 
stemming from patent protection, including both those described by 
traditional economics as well as the costs from productive inefficiencies. 
Indeed, the more fulsome approach to patent analysis described in this 
Article sheds light on unresolved and long-running debates regarding the 
commercialization of patented inventions, the optimal scope of patents on 
chemical compounds, and the improvement of patent examination. 
                                                                                                                     
 316. Hadley, supra note 134, at 383. 
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